48 FEDERAL nnronrsn.
ance. Several tug-boats responded after more or less delay, but first
gave assistance to the Alberto in rescuing her from her dangerous
position on the wharf, and afterwards one of them was sent after the
barge, which had meanwhile drifted with the current of the eddy and
the force of the wind up near the shipping, just below the head of
Canal street, where it was rescued by libelants as aforesaid.
The libelants’ demand for compensation is resisted on the grounds
that the barge was neither derelictnor in danger, and that the serv-
ices of libelants were not valuable, but were oiiicious, without war-
rant and authority, and were for the purpose of fleecing and extort-
ing money from claimants. From the evidence I conclude that the
barge was not derelict, but was in danger of damaging itself and of
doing great damage to other shipping; and while the libelants were
no doubt actuated with the hope of reward, they rendered service in
good faith, with sufficient warrant, and the service so rendered was
valuable. That the services were rendered with a view to reward
ought not to prejudice the libelants' claims in a court of admiralty;
for, as is so well said by Mr. Justice BRADLEY, "salvage is a reward
for meritorious services in saving property in peril on navigable
waters, which might otherwise be destroyed, and is allowed as an en-
couragement to persons engaged in business on such waters and oth-
ers to bestow their utmost endeavors to save vessels and cargo in
peril." See Sonderburg v. Tow-boat Oo. 3 Woods, 146.
The answer charges that the libelants knew the circumstances
under which the barge was turned adrift, and that she was not aban-
doned, and particularly alleges that she was in no danger; but these
charges are not supported by evidence. Under the principles that
govern courts of admiralty in salvage cases, I am unable to see any
sound reason for withholding compensation in this case. The claim-
ants should have complied with the promise of themaster of the A1-
berto, and paid or tendered a small sum at the outset, and the court
would have sustained the tender; but as the claimants, instead, have
resisted, largely increasing the expenses of libelants, and at the same
time have unjustly vilified them, I feel it my duty to make such allow-
ance as will be really compensatory for all but the vilification.
A decree may be entered awarding each of the libelants $25, and
condemning the claimants and their surety, on the release-bond, to
pay the same, together with all costs in the case.