y 18 FEDERAL REPORTER.
ward, while it was nominally at an end, in fact had not te. minated;
that Turpin’s influence over Ralston was unbounded and controlling,
equivalent to that of a father over a son; that the deeds were not vol-
untary, but were suggested and were obtained by undue and improper
influence by Turpin; and that under these circumstances a court of
equity will not permit the deeds to stand. Au abundant wealth of
legal learning relating to the question involved has been gathered by
the research and diligence of the solicitors, and is presented for the
assistance of the court. From these authorities we have ample war-
rant for the opinion that the powers of a court of equity are not only
ample to set aside a conveyance obtained by undue influence, but that,
based upon the broad principles of an elevated morality, this is a con—
spicuous and prominent feature of equity jurisdiction; and where a
Hduciary relation exists, a court of equity will hold that a conveyance
to the party who exercises the dominant power by the person domi-
nated is invalid. 1 Pom. Eq. 492, 493. The statement of the prin-
ciple is clear and ample, and is adopted by the court as expressing
the rule in this case:
"The equitable rules concerning dealings between guardian and ward are
very stringent. The relation is so intimate, the dependence so complete, the
innuence so great, that any transactions between the two parties, or by the
guardian alone, through which the guardian obtains a benefit, entered into
while the relation exists, are in the highest degree suspicious; the presump-
tion against them is so strong that it is hardly possible for them to be sus-
tained. Indeed, many authorities lay down the positive rule that the parties
are wholly incapacitated from contracting, and that any such transaction be-
tweenthem is necessarily voidable. This statement is perhaps too broad. A
will by the ward in his guardian’s favor is not viewed so strictly; the pre-
sumption against it may be overcome and the will sustained. The general
doctrine of equity applies to the parties after the legal condition of guardian·
ship has ended, and as long as the dependence on one side and influence on
the other, presumptively or in fact, continue. This influence is presumed to
last while the guardian’s functions are to any extent still performed, while the
property is still at all under his control, and until the accounts have been
finally settled. Itfollows, therefore, that any conveyance, purchase, sale,
contract, and especially gift, by which the uardian derives a benelit,'made
after the termination of the legal relationgiut while the influence lasts, is
presumed to be invalid and voidable. The burden rests heavily upon the guard-
ian to prove all the circumstances of knowledge, free consent, good faith, ab-
sence of influence, which alone can overcome the presumption. If the legal
relation has ended, and all these circumstances of good faith, full knowledge,
and free consent are clearly shown, a settlement, conveyance, contract, or
even gift from the former ward to his recent guardian will be as valid and
as effective as the same transaction between any other competent persons."
It is contended further by the complainants solicitors that the re-
lation of principal and agent is also within the range of the presump-
sion stated, and they cite Code Ga. § 3177; Kerr, Fraud & M. 172; y
2 Pom. Eq. § 951; 1 Story, Eq. 315; Hunter v. Atkins, 10 Eng. Ch.
113; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Blackf. 509; Harris v. Trcmenheerc, 15
Ves. Jr. 34, and notes.