mm srxrznu. 49
But this charter did not mention Ancon or Chancay, and it did not
contemplate a discharge at places of such a character. It mentions
Arica, "or the next nearest open port," and a second port, to be named
by the charterer, not north of Callao. The only "ports" that can be
reasonably supposed to be referred to in the charter are ports known
to commerce, existing at the time, and therefore having either a cus-
tom of their own, or facilities for the "customary dispatch" of the coast.
The place named as a "second port" was Callao. That port and Arica
are among the largest and best known ports in Peru, and have the
best facilities for discharge. In providing for "customary dispatch"
with those ports primarily in view, the parties in effect stipulated for Q
what would ordinarily be only usual diligence in the discharge. Is it
a reasonable construction of this charter to hold that in providing for
a discharge "at the next nearest open port," in case Arica was block-
aded on the ship’s arrival there, the parties intended to stipulate that
the same rate of discharge that was practicable at the best ports in
Peru should be obligatory at places that up to that moment had never
been ports at all, had no "custom" of their own, and had no facili-
ties for discharge except such as were extemporized or sent thither
under the embarrassments of flagrant war? I think not. Such a
construction seems to me highly unreasonable, and not within any
probable intention of the parties. Without such a construction the
clause has reasonable scope for its operation; it should not, there-
fore, be held to include any unreasonable application.
If, therefore, the clause requiring "customary dispatch" is to be
connected with the provision for going to "the next nearest open `
port," it must be construed in the ordinary way, as meaning only
the custom of the port itself to which the vessel goes; so that the
Spartan, in going to a place which was never a port before, and had
no "customary dispatch," would take no benefit from that clause, be-
cause it would have no application, and no meaning, in reference to
such places. The obligations of the consignees, as respects discharge
at such places, even if the discharge there were held to be within the
provisions of the charter, would therefore be those of reasonable dili-
gence only. Upon this construction the only question would be
whether the charterers’ agents used reasonable diligence in discharg-
ing at the other ports to which the vessel went after the blockade of
both Arica and Gallao. But as the case has been chiefly argued in its
other aspects, viz., as to the effect of the blockade in dissolving the
stipulation of the charter as regards the place and rate of discharge
after the departure from Callao, I proceed to consider it from that
point of view.
  2. Upon the arrival of the Spartan off Arica, that port being block-
aded, the vessel, in accordance with the instructions of Grace & Co.,
the respondents' agents, proceeded to Callao, 600 miles to the north-
ward. The evidence shows that there were many intermediate open
ports between Arica and Callao. The captain might have insisted
v.25F,no.1—4