54 FEDERAL REPORTER.
much as the ship fromdelivering it. In this case the ship did allthat
was required of her in proceeding to the various ports specified. The
cargo could only be received at Arica or at Callao, in lighters. In con-
sequence of the blockade, the ship could not get in "readiness to dis-
charge" the cargo, within the terms of the charter, at either Arica or
Callao, and the consignees were equally disabled from receiving it;
‘ and, after reaching Callao, the charter contained no further appro-
priate provisions.
4. Under the codes of most commercial nations, the obligations
of the ship, in such circumstances, are more or less defined by posi-
tive law,—not, however, by any statutes of England or of the United
States. Sir J AMES Mimsrxsmn, in the case of Christy v. Row, 1 Taunt.
300, remarks as follows:
"Wbere asbip is chartered upon one voyage outwards only, with no refer-
ence to her return, and no contemplation of adisappointment happening, no
decision which I have been able to iind determines what shall be done in
case the voyage is defeated. The books throw no light on the subject. The
natural justice of the matter seems obvious: that a master should do that
which a wise and prudent man would think most conducive to the benelit of
all concerned. But it appears to be wholly voluntary; I do not know that
he is bound to do it; and yet, if it were a cargo of cloth, or other valuable
merchandise, it would be a great hardship that he might be at liberty to cast
it overboard. It is singular that such a. question should at this day remain
undecided." ’
During the Napoleonic wars American vessels bound to European
ports not unfrequently found themselves in that situation. In the
case of The Friends, Edw. 246, Sir Wrnnum Scorr says: ·
"In the case of the American ships bound to France or Holland which
were brought into the ports of this country under the prohibitory law, the
full freight was pronounced to be due where the owners of the cargoes elected
to sell here; where they did not elect to sell here the court left it to them to
settle the freight with the owners of the ships. The court considered a voy-
age from America to this country very nearly the same, in effect, as a voy-
age to those contiguous countries to which those vessels were originally des-
tined; in all probability the markets of this country were not less favorable
than in the blockaded ports, and no doubt the sale was effected with every at-
tention to the interests of the owners of the cargo. _ In those cases the court
gave the master the full benefit of the freight, not by virtue of his contract,
because, looking at the charter-party in the same point of view as the courts
of common law, it could not say that the delivery at a port in England was
a specific performance of its terms; but there being no contract which ap-
plied to the existing state offacts, the court found itself under an obligation
to discover what was the relative equity between the parties. This court sits
no more than the courts of common law do to make contracts between par-
ties; but as a court exercising an equitable jurisdiction, it considers itself
bound to provide, as well as it can, for that relation of interests which has
unexpectedly taken place under a state of facts out of the contemplation of
the contracting parties in the course of the transaction." 4 ·
The provisions of the various commercial codes on this subject are
not uniform. The French Code de Commerce, art. 279, provides that,
"in case of the blockade of the port of destination, the captain, if he