i14 rmnsau. amroarna.
be decreed alimony, etc., to her damage, $5,000. To the petition de—
fendants file a general demurrer. .
The main question presented in this case is this: Can a married
woman maintain an action in her own name for the alienation of the
alfections of her husband, and depriving her of his society, care, and
support? It must be said that no such right of action existed under
the common law by reason of the legal unity of husband and wife.
Has the legislation on the rights of married women in this state re-
» moved this barrier of the common law? In Westlake v. Westlake, 34
Ohio St. 621, this question is discussed at length under the statuteof
that state, and the court, by a divided bench, (a majority of one,)
held that the wife could maintain her action. In Logan v. Logan, 77
Ind. 558, the court, by a majority of one, decided that under the stat-
utes of Indiana the wife could not maintain an action, but, the words
· being slanderous, she could maintain her action of slander. It will
be observed from reading these cases that under both the statutes of
Ohio and Indiana the right of a married woman to sue or be sued
alone was restricted to certain subjects and causes of action. Un-
der the statutes of this state the right of a married woman to sue and
be sued is without restriction or limitation in terms. It reads as fol-
lows: "A woman may, while married, suc and be sued, in the same
manneras if she were unmarried." St. 1879, c. 62, § 3. The stat-
ute also protects her in the enjoyment of her separate real and per-
sonal property, and gives her the right to sell and convey such prop·
erty, and make contracts in reference thereto, to the same extent as
a married man in relation to like property of his own. It also au-
thorizes her to carry on trade and business, and perform labor and
service on her sole and separate account, and makes her earnings her
sole and separate property, and gives her authority to invest the same
in her own name, etc. Sections 1-4, c. 62, Laws 1879.
In reference to the matter of suing or being sued she stands on the
same footing as the unmarried woman. For any violation of per-
sonal rights an unmarried woman has the same remedy that a man
has. She may sue for an injury to her character, her person, or her
property. A right of action to this extent is clearly given to a mar-
ried woman under the statutes. Furrow v. Chapin, 13 Kan. 112;
Townstlin v. Nutt, 19 Kan. 284. Words imputing unchastity to a
female give her a right of action for slander, and it seems to me that
the provision of the statutes of Kansas was intended to and does
liberate a married woman from the common-law disability, so far
as to enable her to sue for any violation of her personal rights, as
well as for injury to her property; and, in the words of the court in
the case of Westlake v. Westlake, supra: "If at. common law the hus-
V band could maintain an action for loss of consortium, of the wife, I
y can see,no reason why, under our law, the wife cannot maintain an
action for the loss of consortium of the husband." It is quite apparent
by the language used that it is the intent of the statute that a