' mrrnasou v. Muse. 31
Court. There is no statute law that I am aware of, and no princi-
ple of law that the court can lay down to you. The railway com-
pany, so far as the law is concerned, as I understand it, are justified
in running at any—at such speed as they may deem best in the
transaction of their business. They may run a train, if they can 1n
safety, at 50 or 60 miles an hour, or 100 miles an hour if that speed
can be reached; but at whatever speed they do run, they must give
timely and reasonable warning of the approach of the train, and the
increased speed bears upon that question. A warning which would
be sufficient if the train was running 5 miles an hour might not be g
sufficient if it was running 25 or 30 miles an hour.
In the absence of a statute, damages cannot be recovered by a father for negligently
causing the death of his minor son. Sullivan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2 Fed. Rep. 447.
In an action for negligently causing the death of a minor. the proper measure of
damages, where the father is the next of kin, is the probable value o the services of
the deceased from the time of his death until his majority, less the expense of his main-
tenance during the same time. Mayhew v. Burns, (Ind.) 2 N. E. Rep. 793; Stafford v.
Rubens, (Ill.) 3 N. E.   568; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly, 73 Ind. 252; City of Chicago
v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468; ockford, R. . & St. L. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198; and the `
jury may take into account. the reasonable expectation of pecun ary benefit from the
continuance of the life even beyond majority. Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.,
(Wis.) 25 N. W. Rep. 223.
But where the next of kin are collateral kindred of the deceased, and have not re-
ceived pecuniary aid from him, they will be entitled to nominal damages only. City
of Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468.
Pyrrmnsou and others v. Muna and others. V
(Circuit Court, D. Colorado. December 31, 1885.)
1. Rm*r.mvm—Pnooass rnom Surn Corm*r—Goons m Possassron or Mn12s1m:..
Goods in possession of a marshal cannot be taken in replevin by process
from a state court. _
2. Sum-Snrr on Bonn-Junrsnrcrron. i
Where such a proceeding is attempted, the marshal may sue on the bond in
his own name, in the federal court, irrespective of the citizenship of himself _
and the obligors in the bond, and so may any one benetlcially interested in
the bond.
8. S.um—C1·rrz11:Nsmr-Assronmnnr.
Where the parties beneficially interested are citizens in a state other than
that of the obligors, they may sue in the federal courts, with, and probably
without, an assignment.
Motion for New Trial.
F. M. Hardbrook, for plaintiff.
C. I. Thomson, for defendant.
Banwmn, J. I see nothing in the motion for a new trial that calls
for hesitation or admits of doubt. The replevin proceedings by De
Walt were unwarranted. Goods in possession of a marshal of the
United States cannot be taken in replevin by process from a state
court. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450.