34 FEDERAL nuronrms.
diligence and care in the protection of the persons of its patrons as
is usually exercised by very prudent persons in their own business
under like circumstances, and is liable for injuries to its passengers
resulting from its own negligence, or want of such care and diligence,
without fault on their part.
The law requires in such cases the highest degree of care and dili-
gence which is reasonably within the power of the persons engaged
in such business. So that if you should find, upon the whole evi-
dence, that the plaintiff, without fault or negligence on her part, and
while the cars were standing still, waiting for passengers-—the plain-
tiff with others—to go on board, she endeavored to go upon the plat-
form of the car, with the intent of going into the car and paying her
fare and becoming a passenger upon defendant’s train; and that, as
she placed her foot upon the step leading to the platform of the car,
at the usual place of entering said car, and took hold of the railing
of the car with one hand, for thepurpose of enabling her to step upon
the platform to enter the said car, while the car was standing still
for theentrance of passengers, the conductor of the train, at that mo-
ment, and without giving the plaintiff reasonable and sufficient time
to get upon the platform of the car, negligently caused or suffered the
train suddenly to start up before the plaintiff had time to get upon
the platform, whereby the plaintiff was thrown upon the ground, and ·
dragged to a distance, causing injury to her person,-the plaintiff in
such case would be entitled torecover for such injury. On the con-
trary, if the jury should believe from the evidence that the injury to
plaintiff was caused by her own want of prudence or care in attempt-
ing to take the train while such train was in motion, or that her own
negligence or want of care contributed in any manner to produce the
injury., she cannot recover, and your verdict in such case should be
for the defendant.
The case presents, in the main, a question of fact for the jury,
and which it becomes your duty to determine from the weight of the
evidence. The burden of proof is with the plaintiff to establish her
case by a preponderance in the weight of the testimony, and in the
trial of the issue it will be the privilege and duty of the jury to con-
sider all the testimony on both sides, and to give to each and all of
the several witnesses, and all the facts and circumstances appearing
upon the trial, such weight and credit as you think them fairly enti-
tled to. Evidence is that which demonstrates and makes clear to the
minds of the jury the issue between the parties, and it is always for
the jury to judge how much credit and weight should, in justice, be
attached to the statements of the several witnesses. Of course, the
number of witnesses testifying to a given state of things for and
against is a material circumstance to be considered by the jury.
But it does not follow from this that you are necessarily to give more
credit to the greater number of witnesses so testifying, as against a
less number testifying to the contrary state of facts. If the jury, all