44 FEDERAL nnponrnn.
rational person. Karow v. Continental Ins. O0., 57 Wis. 56; S.
C. 15 N. W. Rep. 27. Although, in the darkness that enveloped
his mind, the hand of Edward M. Crandal adjusted the fatal noose,
the act was no more attributable to his voluntary agency than if, as a
sane man walking the street in the darkness of night, the same fa-
‘ tality, without co-operation on his part, or even consciousness of
danger, had overtaken him. Therefore it would seem that, in the
one case as in the dther, the death would be attributable to casu-
alty.
Additional force is given to this view of the question when we con-
sider that in cases arising upon life insurance policies, decided by the
supreme court of the United States, it has been repeatedly held that T
if the insured, while in the possession of his ordinary reasoningfac-
ulties, from any motive intentionally takes his own life, such death
is within the proviso on the subject of suicide, and the insurer is
not liable. On the contrary, if the insured takes his life when in-
sane, then the death cannot bei said to be "by his own hand," and
‘ the insurer is liable. And so it would seem to follow that as in the
latter instance the act of self-destruction is not the act of the party,
it must be regarded, in a ease like the present, as brought about by
means which are accidental, because not the result of the concurring
will of the insured.
It is to be further observed that in the policy in suit the company
declares that it incurs no liability in case of death from suicide or
self-indicted injuries. Thus, it appears that the insurer took into
consideration the possibility that the insured might voluntarily, and
with deliberate intent,-that is, as a sane person,—take his life, and
in such case the death was not to be regarded as covered by the con-
tract, because not effected by accidental means. This is the import
of this clause in the policy. But no provision is made against sui-
·cide when insane; and this also adds force to the view that the con-
tract is fairly open to the construction contended for bythe plaintiff.
By the term "self-inflicted injuries," as used in the policy, was not
meant injuries indicted by the insured upon himself when insane,
but injuries, self-inflicted, when capable of rational, voluntary action.
Several cases have been cited by counsel for the defendant.
Among them is Harris v. Tra.veZers’ Ins. O0., decided by the superior
court of Chicago in 1868, and referred to in 7 Amer. Law. Bev. 589;
but the point here involved does not seem to have been there raised.
The deceased was a fireman, who was accidentally buried under a
' falling wall, but was soon rescued without apparent injury, and con-
tinued his work for three months, when he took poison. In a suit
to recover the insurance on the ground that the accident rendered
him insane, it was held that if he was insane on account of the ac-
cident, the death was too remote to be covered by the policy, which
included only proximate results. It would seem that the plaintiff
relied upon the original accident as a ground of recovery, and that