GRANDAL v. ACCIDENT ms. oo. 45
I
was held too remote. Another case cited is Pollock v. United States
Mut. Accident Ass’n, 28 Alb. Law J. 518; but all that was decided
in that case was that the defendant was not liable for a death by poi-
son, because the contract so expressly provided; and in view of that
provision, it made no difference whether the poison was innocently
or intentionally taken. There was no question of insanity involved,
and, moreover, the death was not caused by "external violence," and
this was one of the prerequisites to recover, as fixed in the contract.
In Bayless v. Travelers Ins. Oo., 14 Blatchf. 144, the question of
insanity did not arise, and it is on the same line, in principle,
with Pollock v. United States Mut. Accident Ass’n, supra.
On the whole, my conclusion is that the death of the insured, Ed-
ward M. Crandal, resulted from bodily injuries effected through ex- · .
ternal, accidental, and violent means, within the meaning of the policy
in suit.
Second. Still another and equally interesting question remains to
be determined. The contention of the defendant is that the death
in this case was caused by bodily infirmities or disease, namely, the
insanity of the insured, and therefore that the plaintiff cannot re-
cover. As has been observed, the policy provides that the company
shall not be liable if the death be "caused wholly or in part by bodily
infirmities or disease? The policy further recites that it is issued in
consideration of the warranties made in the application for insurance,
and of the premium paid; and in the application signed by the in-
sured he makes certain statements of fact, usual inrsucli cases, the
last of which, numbered 15, is as follows:
"I am aware that this insurance will not extend to * * * any bodily
injury happening directly or indirectly in consequence of disease; nor to death
or disability caused wholly orin part by bodily inflrmities or by disease; * * *
nor to any case, except when the accidental injury shall be the proximate
and sole cause of disability or death."
This is not a warranty of any fact. It is, in effect, merely an ad-
mission of knowledge on the part of the insured of such limitations
of liability as may be declared in the policy. As, therefore, it is to
the policy we must look for those limitations, it is observable that
the policy does not declare that the insurance shall not extend to any
bodily injury "happening direct/y. or indirectly in consequence of dis-
ease;" but only that it shall not extend "to death or disability which
may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or dis-
ease." This, then, is the limitation of liability to be considered, as
it is expressed in the policy issued and delivered subsequently to the
application for insu1·ance, rather than the statements on the subject
contained in the application. The nfteenth clause in the applica-
tion is not referred to in the policy. Wherein, therefore, it differs
from the written contract it is no part of the contract.
The argument of counsel for the defendant is, in brief, that in-
sanity is a bodily infirmity or disease; that in ordinary life insur-