46 FEDERAL Rsronrmx.
ance cases it is regarded and characterized by the courts as a dis-
ease, and therefore it is that insurance companies are held liable in
cases of suicide when the insured was insane; further, that in the
case in hand the act of self-destruction was occasioned by the in-
sanity, and so, that within the meaning of the policy, the death was
caused by disease. I was much impressed with the force of this
argument, and if I may use the language of DENMAN, J., in a case
hereafter referred to, "but for Winspear v. Accident Ins. Oo., 6 Q. B.
Div. 42, I am not sure but that I should have thought the company
were protected."
It is true that in cases upon life policies death by an insane sui-
t cide is regarded by the courts as death by disease. As it is expressed
in Eastabrook v. Union Mal. LUe Ins. Oo., 54 Me. 224, "death by dis-
ease is provided for by the policy. Insanity is a disease. Death
which is the result of insanity is death by disease." It is to be borne
in mind, however, that these and similar observations are made in
a class of cases where the insurance is not special but general, and
where the protection which it is intended to afford covers all diseases
and disorders—other than those which may be specially excepted
-—which result in death. In the case of a life policy, it may not
matter whether the disease of insanity or the particular act of self-
destruction be regarded as the immediate cause of death. It is the
life which is insured, and liability arises when death occurs, unless
the death is within one of the specially excepted cases enumerated in
the policy. The fact, therefore, that in such cases it is said that
death which is the result of insanity is death by disease does not
reach the question we have here, which is, what, under the provisions
of a policy which covers accidents only, was the cause of death? In
the sense of the clauses on the subject in this policy, was the death
caused by disease, or by the act of violence in question? Although
the words of the policy are, "caused wholly or in part by bodily in-
firmities or disease," I suppose the true inquiry is, what was the
actual, proximate cause of death? For, in law, there is but one
cause. That is the proximate cause, which may either directly or
indirectly produce the result. If the death was caused in part by
disease, the disease must have been a proximate cause of death.
“One of the most valuable criteria furnished us bythe authorities,"
says Mr. Justice MILLER, in Insurance O0. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44,
"is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the
fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power
has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the mis-
fortune, the other must be considered as too remote." In Insurance
C0. v. Transportation Oo., 12 Wall 199, it was said by Mr. Justice
Srnouoz
“TllBI’0 is undoubtedly ditiiculty in many cases attending the application of
the maxim, proxima. causa non remota spectatur, but none when the causes
succeed each other in order of time. In such cases the rule is plain.