CRANDAL v. Aocrnamr ms. co. 47
When one of several successive causes is sufiicieut to produce that effect, the
law will not regard an antecedent cause of that cause, or the causa causans.
In such a case there is no doubt which cause is the proximate one, within
the meaning of the maxim. But when there is no order of succession in
tiine,—when there are two concurrent causes of a loss,-the prealominatiny,
ejicient one must be regarded as the proximate, when the damage done by A
each cannot be distinguished."
_ The cases most nearly in point upon the question here in judgment
are Reynolds v. Accidental Ins. C0., 22 Law T. (N. S.) 820; Win-
spear v. Accident Ins. C0. 6 Q. B. Div. 42; Lawrence v. Accidental Ins.
Oo., 7 Q. B. Div. 216; and Schafer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249.
Although it may extend this opinion to greater length than is de-
sirable, it seems necessary to give attention to these cases somewhat
in detail.
In the Reynolds Case the facts were that Thomas Humphrey ef-
fected with the defendant company "a policy of insurance, whereby
it was declared that if, during the continuance of such policy, the
said Thomas Humphrey should receive or suffer bodily injury from
any accident or violence, in case such accident or violence should cause
the death of the said Thomas Humphrey within three calendar months
after the occurrence of such accident or violence, the full sum of
three hundred pounds should be payable to the personal representa-
tives, etc.: provided, also, and it is hereby expressly agreed and de-
clared, that no claim shall be payable by the said company under the
policy in respect of death or injury by accident or violence, unless
such death or injury shall be occasioned by some external and mate-
rial cause operating upon the person of the said insured, and unless, in
the case of death, as aforesaid, sach death shall take place from such
accident or violence within three calendar months," etc. It appeared
that Humphrey, while the policy was in force, wentinto the sea to
bathe. While in a pool about one foot deep he became suddenly in. ‘
sensible from some unexplained internal cause, and fell into the water
with his face downwards. A few minutes afterwards he was found
lying dead, with his face in the water, and water escaped from his
lungs in such a manner as to prove that he had breathed after falling
into the water. The question for the opinion of the court was
whether the death of Humphrey occurred in a manner entitling the
plaintiff, as his executor, to receive the sum of £30O under or by vir-
tue of the policy. Bosanquet, for the defendant, argued that "if a
man is pushed into the water, or forcibly held down in it, his death
then results from violence, within the meaning of the policy. If a
man accidentally falls into water, and is drowned, his death results
from accident; but if a man falls down in, a_/it in a. shallow pool, and
is drowned, his death is the result, not of accident or of violence, but
of the nt, even though the immediate cause of death be, as here, suf-
focation by drowning." Wrnmas, J., said: "In this case the death re-
sulted from the action of the water on the lungs, and from the conse-
. quent interference with respiration. I think that the fact ofthe de-