CRANDAL v. ACCIDENT INS. C0. 49
the lit, but by the drowning, so here it was not caused by the insan-
ity or disease, but by the act of self-destruction.
In the case of Lawrence there was a policy of insurance against
death from accidental injury, which contained the following condi-
tion:
"This policy insures payment only in case of injuries accidentally occur-
ring from material and external cause operating upon the person of the in-
sured, where such accidental injury is the direct and sole cause of death to
the insured; * * * but it does not insure in case of death arising from
_/iis, * * * or any disease whatever arising before or at the time or fol-
lowing such accidental injury, (whether consequent upon such accidental in-
jury or not, and whether causing such death directly or jointly with such ac-
cidental injury.)"
· ` The insured, while at a railway station, was seized by a tit, and
fell od the platform across the railway, and an engine and carriages
passed over his body and killed him. The falling forward of the in-
sured oif the platform was in consequence of his being seized with a
tit or sudden illness, and but for such fit or illness he would not
have suffered injury and death. Damuan, J., following the authority
of Winspear v. Accident Ins. O0., held the company liable. Winn-
mvis, J., placed his concurring opinion upon the following grounds:
"The whole case depends on the true construction of the words in the pro-
viso, because in this case the deceased person, having fallen down accident-
ally in a fit from the platform of the railway on to the rails, was, while lying
there, accidentally run over by a train that happened at that moment unfor-
tunately to come up, and he was undoubtedly killed by the direct external
violence of the engine upon his body, which caused his death immediately.
The question arises whether, according to the true construction of the pro-
viso, it can be said that this is a case of a death arising from a tit; because,
if this death did not arise from the lit, according to the true construction of
the policy, the remainder of the clause does not comeinto existence at all, and
is inapplicable. It seems to me that the well-known maxim of Lord Bacon,
which is applicable to all departments of the law, is directly applicable in this
case. Lord BAOON’B language in his Maxims of the Law, reg. 1, runs thus:
*It wereinfinite for the law to consider the causes of causes, and their impul-
sions one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause.’
Therefore I say, according tothe true principle of law`, I must look at only the
immediate and proximate cause of death; and it seems to me to be impracti-
cable to go back to cause upon cause, which would lead us back ultimately
to the birth of the person; for had he not been born, the accident would not
have happened. The true meaning of this proviso is that if the death arose
from a nt, then the company are not liable, even though accidental injury
contributed to the death in the sense that they were both causes which op-
erated jointly in causing it. That is the meaning, in my opinion, of this
proviso. Bnt it is essential to that construction that it should be made out
that the fit was a cause in the sense of being the proximate and immediate
cause of the death, before the company are exonerated; and it is not the less
so because you can show that another cause intervened and assisted in the
causation."
Thus it appears that although the proviso in the policy in that case
was that if the death should arise from a {it the company should not
be liable, even though accidental injury contributed to the death by
v.271=.no. 1-4
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