2 FEDERAL 1zEroR*rE1z. A
from her husband be adjudged void, the land sold, and out of the
proceeds the alimony Hrst paid; then that, out of the fractional in-
_ terest in the remainder belonging to Charles W. Chapman as one of
the heirs of her husband, she be paid $10,000 damages, which she
alleges she has sustained by reason of the non-payment of this ali-
mony, and that the balance be distributed among the other heirs of
her husband. She further says that she obtained her divorce from
her husband on the ground of his fault, and that she is entitled,
therefore, under the Kansas statute, to one·half interest in the land,
which she prays may be set over to her. All these things are grouped
together in one petition. C
So far as the complaint for damages against Charles W. Chapman
is concerned, it does not seem to me that she states any cause of ac-
tion at all; and so far as the balance of the case is concerned, in it
the other heirs are interested. The mere fact that she could have
maintained an action against Charles W. Chapman alone does not
necessarily determine the question of a separable controversy. If
there was an action of tort,—an assault and battery committed by
two defendants,—she could maintain an action against either one
separately; but if she joins the two, there is but a single controversy.
There is not a separable controversy between her and each defend-
, ant. So, here, if this conveyance was made in trust, as she says, the
heirs of her husband—the grantor of that trust-are interested in the
land after the trust has been performed, and interested against her
claim to inherit one-half, as well as to subject the land to the pay-
ment of the alimony. This is the character of`her averment: that
they are interested as the heirs of l1er husband. She has but one
claim in this respect against them all. Whether, as a matter of
fact, they are interested,--whether the deed was made in trust or in
fraud,—cannot be determined until the testimony is presented. But
upon the face of the papers there is no separable controversy between
him and her, and therefore a motion to remand must be sustained.
— GMNNELL, State’s Atty., etc., ex rel. Cmoseo Hosrirsn ron WoMmN
AND Cmnnsnn v. Jonsson and others} ‘
(Circuit Court, NZ D. Illinois. July 6, 1886.)
1. REMOVAL or CAUSE Enom STATE Cousr-Som- nr STATE IS nor REMovABLE.
A chancery suit, instituted in a state court by the state’s attorney, in the
. name of the people of the state, for the purpose of preserving a fund alleged
to be held in trust for a charitable use, and for the purpose o having a bene-
ficiary designated to receive such fund, is a_ suit by the state in its own court,
and hence is not removable. under any existing aw, from a state court to a
federal court. · ·
1Edited by Russell H. Curtis. Esq., ofthe Chicago bar.