6 FEDERAL nE1>o1vrEB.
amounting to something over $3,000 in value; that it was the agree-
ment between the Gratiot Manufacturing Company and Dixon that
the machinery so sold should be put into the mill in such a manner
that it might be removed without injury to the premises, and that the
manufacturing company should hold the title to the machinery until
paid for; and that the plaintiff consented to this arrangement, and
agreed to pay some portion of the purchase price of the machinery.
They also allege that $600 only of the purchase price being paid by
Dixon, the Gratiot Manufacturing Company took his notes of $600
and $1,881.73 for the balance, and afterwards a mortgage on the
property in foreclosure to secure the notes.
The suit was begun in the state circuit court for La Fayette county,
and the Home National Bank filed a petition and bond for removal
to this court, alleging that there is a controversy wholly between the
bank on the one side, and the plaintiffs with defendant Dixon on the
other side, which is severable, and may be determined without the
presence of the other parties. The plaintiffs move to remand the
case to the state court on the ground that there is no such separate
and distinct controversy as is claimed by the defendant bank.
I think the case not materially distinguishable in principle from
several cases already decided by the United States supreme court,
wherein the jurisdiction of the federal court has been declined, and
that it should be ruled by the cases of Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S.
187; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Huntington, 117
U. S. 280; S. C. 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733,-and other kindred cases. See
the following cases, among others, recognizing and illustrating the
same principle: Thayer v. Life Ins. Ass’n, 112 U. S. 717; S. C. 5
Sup. Ct. Rep. 355; Central R. Co. v. Mills, 113 U. S. 249; S. C. 5
Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Louisville rt N. R. C0. v. Iole, 114 U. S. 52; S.
C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Putnam v. Ingraham, 114 U. S. 57; S. C.
5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 746; St. Louis ch S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 114 U. S.
60; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41; S. C. 5
Sup.Ct. Rep. 1034, 1161; Crump v. Thurber, 115 U. S. 56; S. C. 5 ‘
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1154; Rand v. Walker, 117 U. S. 340; S. C. 6 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 769; Price v. Foreman, 11 Biss. 328; S. C. 12 Fed. Rep.
‘ 801; Mitchell v. Tillotson, 11 Biss. 325; S. C. 12 Fed. Rep. 737;
` Carraher v. Brennan, 7 Biss. 497; Chester v. Chester, 7 Fed. Rep. 1;
Freicller v. Chotard, 19 Fed. Rep. 227; In re McC'lean, 26 Fed. Rep.
49; Lyddy v. Gano, Id. 177; Perrin v. Lepper, Id. 545; Winchell v.
Carll, 24 Fed. Rep. 865.
There is but one cause of action in tl1e case, which is the foreclos-
ure of the mortgage and the proper adjustment of the several liens
upon the property. To this action the mortgagor, who is the holder
of the equity of redemption, and who is liable for any deficiency, is a
necessary party. He is, indeed, the principal party defendant, re-
sides in the same state with the plaintiffs, and cannot be ranged on
the same side with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of making a case for