THOMPSON v. DIXON. 7
removal to the federal court. James B. Ginn is also a necessary
party to a complete determination of the controversy, holding, as he
claims, a lien upon the mortgaged premises by judgment in the state
court, rendered for services as mechanic in putting the same ma- ‘
chinery into the mill, and for lumber, nails, and other materials fur- .
nished and put in by him, for which the statute of the state gives
him a lien upon the mill and mill property. He is, I think, a neces-
sary party to the foreclosure, and also to the claim made by the bank,
if that can be considered a distinct cause of action.
We are asked to look into the contract between the Gratiot Manu-
facturing Company and Dixon, a copy of which is attached to the
answer of the bank, for the purpose of determining that the rights of
the bank are superior, not only to those of the plaintiff and the de-
fendant the mortgagor, but to those of the defendant Ginn, as well.
But we might, with the same propriety, be called upon to look into
the mortgage itself to determine that the rights of plaintiffs are su-
perior to those of the mortgagor, and so conclude that the latter has _
no interest in the controversy adverse to the former, and is not a
necessary party to the foreclosure. We cannot say, in advance of
the hearing, what defense may be made to the contract. We cannot
look into the evidence cx parte to determine the merits, and to say
just how the rights of the various lienholders should be adjudged.
The priority and order of these liens, and their proper adjustment,
may depend upon very nice considerations. and can only be adjudged
after full hearing of the merits. It is enough to say that Ginn has
put in an answer claiming a specific lien by judgment upon the prop-
erty generally. V `
That his lien might be postponed, and made subject to the lien of
the bank, upon a full consideration of the merits, is nothing to the ·
purpose of the question before us. Upon that question we can only
look at the record and pleadings; and, in order to take jurisdiction,
the court should be able to see from these that there is a separate
controversy between citizens of different states,——a separate and dis-
tinct cause of action,—on which a separate and distinct suit might
have been brought, and complete relief afforded as to such cause of
action, with all the parties on one side of that controversy citizens
of different states from those on the other. The case must be one
capable of separation into parts, so that in one of the parts a con-
trove1·sy will be presented with citizens of one or more states on one
side, and citizens of other states on the other, which can be fully de-
termined without the presence of other parties to the suit as it has T
been begun. Fmscr v.Jenni.s0n, 106 U. S. 191; S. C. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep.
171; Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90.
This is not such a case. Here is but one cause of action, which is
the foreclosure of the mortgage, and the proper adjustment of the
various liens and claims upon the property, and, incidentally, to re-
cover judgment against the mortgagor for any deficiency. The fact