BARDEN ·v. crrv or DULUTH. 15
the territory within the limits of the new organization. Neither the
city nor the village of Duluth ever took any steps to foreclose these
commissioners certificates. On March 7, 1884, complainant pur-
chased from the contractors the certificates in controversy, and on
April 28, 1884, filed this bill; making the city and village of Duluth,
as well as the lot-owners, parties defendant, and praying that the
city and village be ordered to proceed with the collection, and also
praying directly a foreclosure as against the lots. ~
The principal defense is the statute of limitations. Nearly 13 years
passed after the right of action accrued before any efforts were made
to collect these certificates,—indeed, before the complainant acquired
any interest in them. The bill alleges frequent demands on the mu-
nicipal authorities for action, and refusals to act; but the answers
deny this, and no proof is offered. The case, therefore, stands with _
the legislation of 1877 as the single excuse for delay. If this is to
be considered a proceeding to enforce a statutory liability, six years
creates a bar; if to foreclose a mortgage, ten years. If a legal right
of similar nature was sought to be enforced in an action at law, the
bar of the statute would be inexorable and unquestioned; and equity
follows the law, not blindly, perhaps, or ignoring excuses for delay,
such as fraud, concealment, or other matters appealing to the con-
science of the chancellor. As the supreme court says in Geddea v.
Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201, after noticing an exception: -
"But the rule still is that when a party has been guilty of such laches in
prosecuting his equitable remedy as would bar him if his title was solely at
law, he will be barred in equity, from a wise consideration of the paramount
importance of quieting titles." i -
See, also, Sullivan v. Portland et K. R. C0., 94 U. S. 806, in which
this language is used: "Nothing can call forth this court into activ-
ity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence." Wood,
Lim. 108, 1,12, and cases in note; Ang. Lim. § 25, and following.
Now, as I said, the only excuse shown for delay is the legislation
of 187 7,—legislation nearly six years after the accruing of the right
of action. Whatever effect such legislation may have had upon
' the municipal existence of the city of Duluth, it in no manner dis-
abled thiscourt, or any other court of equitable powers. The same
relief which is sought by this bill could have been obtained at any
time during these many years. There never has been a day since
the right of action accrued in 1871 that the owner of these certifi-
cates could not find an open court, and have enforced his rights.
Many considerations exist why the ordinary bar of the statute
should not in this case be relaxed. ‘ Most of the individual defend-
ants acquired their interests in the lots long after these certificates
were issued, and in actual ignorance of their existence. Such liabil-
ities are not voluntary assumed obligations of the lot-owners, but are
cast in tnvitum upon them. They are given by statute large inter-
est, with a view of compelling speedy payment, and their actual pay-