. ALLEN v. O’DONALD. 21.
ablyfavorable circumstances, and the result is better evidence of its
value than the ex post facto conjecture of persons interested in up-‘
holding the price of lands in the vicinity. The very appraisemcnt
itself, made by the owner of the land, in conjunction with others of
his selection or approval, ought to far outweigh any such testimony
as this. Besides, it is not to be expected that mortgaged property,
when sold on account of the default of the debtor, is to be disposed
of "at private sale, under ordinary circumstances," whatever that
means, but at auction, at a forced sale, for what it will bring in cash.
‘ If these five persons were asked what the land would sell for in 1876
under those circumstances, they probably would not differ much from
the appraisers.
But admitting, for the purposes of the argument, that the property
was even worth, at a forced sale, $20,000, as alleged in the answer, the
fact is of no avail to the defendants. Casting the interest on the
amounts admitted to be due on these notes from the dates specified in
the admission,-four years and seven months in the case or the first
one, and seven years and six months in the second one,—and deduct-
iug_ therefrom the sum of $1,686.35, interest paid on the latter on Feb-
ruary 1, 1883, and the proceeds of the sale by the receiver ($44,-
7 69.04) from the date of the confirmation of the sale, November 10,
1885, and there is now due on_tbese notes $36,417.08. Now, charge
the plaintiff, if you please, with the difference between $20,000, the al-
leged value of the lands sold, and the sum they were actually sold
for, $11,406.19, and there is still a deficit of $25,010.89, or over $15,-
000 more than the value of the surety property. In the face of these
facts it is idle to talk about the surety being injured by the cred-
itor’s management of the debtor’s property. The only persons who
appear to be injured are themselves; and that, not because of the
mismanagement of the property, but the fact that they trusted the
debtor beyond his means of payment. T
It is admitted that Mrs. Cross’ property was put into these mort-
gages as a security for her husband’s debts, and it is not disputed
that if his creditors gave up their lien on any portion of their debtor’s
property without a corresponding reduction in the amount of the debt,
and the surety will be injured thereby, that her property is so far dis-
charged. This rule does not depend on the contract between the
surety and the creditor, but on equitable principles inherent in the re-
lation of principal and surety, which require that the property of the
former pledged to the creditor for the payment of his debt shall be
applied to that purpose, so as to prevent the burden of the debt from
being thrown on the surety. A creditor with a lien on his debtor’s
property is so- far a trustee for the surety, and must not do any act "
which will deprive him of the benefit of it. On paying the debt the
surety is subrogated to the right of the creditor in this respect, and if,
in the mean time, the latter has done anything to impair the value of
such right, the former is so far discharged from his liability. Brandt,