24 FEDERAL anrouruiz.
was injured by it, which she was not, but rather the contrary; for it
goes without saying that the property sold under this arrangement
brought more than it would at an ordinary sheriH’s sale.
Third. The suit is barred by the lapse of time or laches of the
creditors.
"In the consideration of purely equitable rights and titles courts of
equity act_in analogy to the statute of limitations, but are not bound
by it." Manning v. Hayden, 5 Sawy. 379. “When an action upon
a legal title to land would be barred by the statute, courts of equity
will apply a like limitation to suits founded on equitable rights to
the same property." Hall v. Russell, 3 Savvy. 515. "In cases of
concurrent jurisdiction, such as matters of account, etc., where the
party may proceed either at law or in equity, the statute of limita-
tions applies with equal force in both courts. In such cases courts
of equity consider themselves within the spirit of the statute, and act
in obedience to it; but inthe consideration of purely equitable rights
and titles they act in analogy to the statute, but are not bound by
it." Hall v. Russell, 3 Sawy. 515; Wood, Lim. § 58.
The remedy on these notes is a case of concurrent jurisdiction, and
` the limitation prescribed by the statute of the state (six years) ap-
plies in this suit as well as an action at law. Therefore the question
of laches does not arise in the case. The plaintiff has all the time
the statute gives him, and no more, in any case. Section 25 of the
Code of Civil Procedure regulates the eifect of a payment of principal
or interest on a note after it becomes due, and declares "the limita-
tion shall commence from the time thelast payment was made." In
Sulherlin v. Robe·rts,,4 Or. 378, it was held that the fact of part pay-
ment on a note is made the test by this section for ascertaining
whether an action thereon is barred, and if not barred the same may
be maintained on the original promise, and that any person who
could be compelled to pay the note is competent to make the pay-
ment. The payment in that case was made by the administrator of
the payor.
The first of these notes, allowing three days of grace, fell due on
November 4, 1874, when the statute commenced to run, and if no pay-
ment had intervened the bar would have been complete by this same
day in 1880. But on January 1, 1877, and in 1878, 1880, and on
December 22, 1881, payments of interest were made on the note
amounting to $5,780.71. The second note, allowing days of grace,
fell due on January 26, 1873. The interest was paid in full to Jan-
uary 25, 1879, one day before the statute had run, but whether all
on that day, or year by year, as it fell due, does not appear, but pre-
sumably the latter. However, it is a matter of no moment here.
On February 1, 1883, a payment of interest was made thereon of
$1,686.35. This suit was commenced on August 6, 1884, when six
years had not elapsed since the last payment on either note, and
therefore the remedy on them is not barred.