WIGTON U. BRAINERD.  
not operate to keep alive the obligation as to a co-surety who was not privy to it, or in
no way participated in it. Probate Judge v. Stevenson, (Mich.) 21 N. W. Rep. 348.
(d) Part Payment by Assignee for Benefit qf Ureddors. A. benng indebted to B. for
wages, made an assignment for benefit of creditors, and the assignee paid B. several
small sums at various times on account, and finally gave him a check for $4.83, "to be
applied as final dividend" on his claim against A. The claim became barred by the
statute of limitations before B. sued to recover the balance due. Held, that the pay-
ments by the assignee did not keep the claim alive, and that B. could not recover.
Parsons v. Clark, (Mich.) 26 N. W. Rep. 656.
It is held by the supreme court of Nebraska, Clark v. Chambers, 22 N. W. Rep. 229,
that the pafyment of a dividend by the assignee of an insolvent debtor is not such a part
payment 0 a debt, barred by the statute of limitations, as to take the remainder out of
the statutory limitation as against the debtor; citing Marienthal v. Mosler, 16 Ohio St.
566; Stoddard v. Doane, 7 Gray, 387; Pickett v. King. 34 Barb. 193; Roosevelt v. Mark,
6 Johns. Ch. 266.
In Letson v. Kenyon, (Kan.) 1 Pac. Rep. 562, where the maker of a note thereafter
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and in such assignment scheduled this
note and directed his assignee to convert the assigned property into money and pay his
debts, and in pursuance thereof the assignee took possession and converted said prop-
erty into money, and applied the same in part payment of the assignor’s debts, this
note among the number, it was held that the payment, being one made in pursuance
of express directions from the assignor for his benefit, and out of the proceeds of his
pgoperty, is such a payment as avoids the bar of the statute of limitations under the
ansas statute; and this, notwithstanding the proceedings under the assignment are
controlled by the provision of a. general statute concerning assignments for the benefit
of creditors. The court cite Jackson v. Fairbank, 2 H. Bl. 340; Barger v. Durvin, 22
Barb. 68.
WIGTON 'U. BRAINERD•
(Oircuit Court, D. Vermont. July 8, 1886.)
Cosrs-FAILURE or PROSECUTION—DISMISSAL—DOCKET FEE.
Where a suit is dismissed for want of prosecution, a docket fee to the d0·
fendant is not taxable.
In Equity. ’ V
No appearance for plaintiff.
Guy O. Noble, for defendant.
WHEELER, J. This suit was dismissed, with costs, for want of pros-
ecution. The defendant claims a docket fee of $20 as a part of the
costs to be taxed, which the clerk has disallowed. This whole subject
is carefully examined, and all the cases up to that time, bearing upon
it, are reviewed, by Mr. Justice Bmrcnsonn, in Wooster v. Handy, 23
Fed. Rep. 49. The conclusion is there reached that this docket fee
in such cases is not taxable. That case is controlling here, notwith-
standing the different views expressed by Judge Hsmmonn in Partee
v. Thomas, 27 Fed. Rep. 429.
Taxation of clerk affirmed.