KING v. IJUNDEE Mozvreaem an TRUST INVEST. co. 35
thing in common between them was the questionof the validity of the
law under which they claimed the right to collect the several taxes
levied by them. So, here, the interest of these plaintiffs in the opera-
tion of this decree, and its reversal, is distinct and separate from their
co-defendants therein, and they may maintain this suit without mak-
ing them parties thereto.
And now, under the circumstances, ought this decree to be reversed.
There is no error apparent on the face of the record, and the sugges-
tion of error is based wholly on the difference between the judgment
of the court in the case and that in Crawford v. Linn Co. Without
stopping to consider which of these decisions is nearest right, or most
reasonable, and admitting that this court ought to follow the construe- _
tion given to the constitution of the state by its own courts in this mat-
ter, is it under any obligation to reverse a decision heretofore made by
it simply because it does not conform to a subsequent ruling of the .
state court?
When this decree was made this court followed the rulings of the
state court on all the points in the case concerning which the oracle
had then spoken. But whether the act was passed in violation of
section 1 of arti_cle 9 of the constitution, which requires the legisla-
tive assembly to "provide.by law for uniform and equal rate of as-
sessment and taxation," or in violation of section 23 of article 4
thereof, which forbids the passage of "speeial or local laws" “for the
assessment and collection of taxes," had not then been considered by
the state court. Under the circumstances, it was the right and duty
of this court to decide these questions for itself, and according to the
light then vouchsafed it. If the decree is erroneous, compared with
the constitution and law of the state as then construed and understood,
it ought to be reversed, otherwise not. While the national courts are
bound to follow the settled construction given by the local court to
the state constitution, I am not aware of any rule of law, or consid-
eration of public policy, convenience, or comity, that requires the for-
mer to go back, and change its judgments or decrees to make them
conform to the subsequent rulings of the latter. When this decree
was made, it was in strict conformity with the settled construction
given to the state constitution by the state court, so far as the latter
had gone, and this was all that could have been required.
It may be said that the decision of the state court in Crawford v.
Linn Co. did not change the law or legal significance of the con-
stitution, but only declared what it was, as well when this decree was
given as since. But suppose this court in making this decree had fol-
lowed a prior decision of the state court, and-afterwards the latter
had changed front on the question; and that this is a supposable
case,-—is common knowledge,-because the like, at least sometimes,
happens; would this court be bound, on a bill of review, to reverse
its decree, made in conformity with the constitution of the state as
then expounded by the state tribunal, because the latter had since