Fnsousou rv. DENT. 9
plain that the plaintiffs’ rights of property under the final decree
would not be affected by the action of the court? No more are they `
affected by the action we now take in continuing this receiver. .,
The only possible fault with this reasoning that occurs to me is, that
' by the final decree we adjudged, not only the right of property, but
also the right of possession,——construing the decree as plaintiffs con- ~
struc it,—to them; thereby technically bringing the possession of the
receiver within the inhuence of the supersedeas law, so that the right to
that possession, so decreed, could only be suspended by command of the
statute, and not otherwise. The court and parties certainly intended
to surrender the possession along with the right of property decreed,
unless defendants complied with the statute; but the court did not ini
tend to do so by that decree, and supposed that, if the defendants
did not give the bond, the receiver would nrst pass his accounts, and
then surrender the property by some subsequent order to that effect.
But this is beside the question, and of no importance now, I think;
for, being better informed, the court Ends it has larger power than it
was aware of, and that its continued control does not depend at all
upon whether a bond was given or not. I think it is not precluded
hy the final decree from exercising that larger power.
In other words, it is proposed now to exercise only that power
which Mr. Justice BRADLEY confirms in Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.
S. 150, S. C. 3 Sup. Ct.°B.ep. 136, and Mr. Chief Justice Wurm in
Leonard v. Ozark Land Co., 115 U. S. 465, S. C. 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127,
and for the exercise of which, so far as it relates to irajunctions, the
ninety-third equity rule was established. That rule does not extend
to the regulation of the practice in the matter of continuing receivers
pending an appeal, but the power is not created byor derived from
the rule at all, and exists without it. The court not yet having pre-
scribed any precise regulations in relation to receivers, we are directed
by equity rule 90 to the general practice as it existed in 1842, just as
the supreme court itself is directed by its rule 3 to the practice prior
to 1791. This practice, in its relation to receivers, Mr. Daniell
briefly summarizes at the last citation above made from that author,
and Mr. Justice BRADLEY in Hovey v. McDonald, supra. That case
is somewhat complicated by a reference to the local practice on ap-
peals from special to general term in the District of Columbia, which
misled counsel in Leonard v. Ozark Land`O0., supra; but a careful
reading makes it very plain in its application here. I had intended
to quote largely from it, but forbear, as nothing less than a careful
reading of the whole case will suffice. It was the case of a receiver,
and I regard it as directly in point as to the doctrine to control us
here. It shows that the superaedeac of the statute does not suspend
the power of the court below as to the receiver, pending the appeal,
any morelin a case coming from the circuit court than the one from
which that appeal then under discussion came. It is a general prin-
ciple of our appellate law, established, as to the effect of an appeal