10 FEDERAL nsrosrnn.
upon an iryunction, in the Slaughter-house Gases, 10 Wall. 273. The
, only reasonable doubt in its application here, as before suggested, is
as to the power of this court after the final decree and the term at
which it was rendered; but the ninety-third equity rule itself recog-
nizes that it then exists, as well as before, as itdid in England, and
does yet; for it directs the judge to exercise it when he "allows" the
appeal, which maybe after the term at which the final decree was
rendered, and at any time within the statute of limitations. There
is no reason why the court may not exercise it at any time, particu- I
larly since Goddard v. Ordway, 94 U. S. 672, decides that it is the
duty of the court below, notwithstanding an appeal, to give the neces-
r sary orders to preserve the property in the hands of the receiver
pending the appeal whenever it remains in its possession.
Now, applying the doctrine here, and it appears that the hnal de-
cree directed the possession of the receiver to be delivered to the
plaintiffs. As already explained, it was not thereby intended to de-
termine that pending the appeal they should have possession. As to
that no specialdirections were given, as ought to have been done;
” but, as a fact, it was supposed that a supersedes: bond would be neces-
sary to continue the receiver pending the appeal. It was further
, supposed that a supersedeas bond had been given, and in fact the re-
ceiver has been continued without any special instructions to that
eilect. A bond intended to be a sapersedeas, but omitting the opera-
tive words, wasiiled, and the proof shows that the omission was by
mistake. But this mistake, under the doctrine we are considering, is
beside the question, because, if there had been a good bond, it would
not have superseded the directions of the final decree concerning the
receiver, be they what they may; and, of course, a defective bond
could have no effect in that direction. In Hovey v. McDonald, supra,
the directions to the receiver were to deliver the fund, and they were
not in the decree at 1'irst, but the supreme court sanctioned the in-
sertion of them by amendment; saying, however, that "i`t wasmerely
expressing the legal effect and consequence of the decree ;" so here `
· the directions given merely expressed the legal effect of the decree
without them. y
The plaintiffs were as much entitled to the possession then as now,
and no more now by reason ·of the mistake than they would be now
without it. Wherefore, when they ask us to discharge the receiver,
l we consider the application independently of the mistake; and, I
think, for reasons stated, the court should 1·etain its control pending
the appeal, at least until the supreme court directs otherwise, and I
, should, as I understand the law, make the same ruling precisely if the V
defendantshad appealed intentionally without a. supersedeas, though
at the time .the appeal was granted I thought, as we all did, that a
supersedeas was absolutely necessary to effectuate that result. Draw
a broad line between the right of property of the plaintiifs, whether
they claim; under the original title or the final decree, and the right