Umrno srarns v. AMERICAN nam. rararnom oo. 43
Rev. St.) classes “managing agent" with "cashier," "secretary,” and
"treasurer,"¥ and next after "president" or "chief officer" of the cor-
poration. .   » , ~·“
Neither the averments of the bill, nor the facts set up in the plea
or disclosed in the contracts, establish any such relation between the
Bell Telephone Company and the local corporations as will constitute
the latter the "managing agents" of the former, under the authori-
ties, or the clear import of the terms. But it is insisted by counsel
for the government that the American Bell Telephone Company, in
acquiring the ownership and possession of the franchises and grant
described in the letters patent issued to Alexander Graham Bell, has
thereby ceased to be a state corporation, and has become national in
its character, and is to be treated precisely as though it were a cor-
poration organized under the laws of the United States, with authority
to do business in any part ofthe Union; that, as a patent-holding
corporation, it is "domesticated," and is to be "found" wherever its
patent is used. This position cannot be sustained. The franchise
which the patent grants consists altogether in the right to exclude
any one from making, using, and vending the thing patented without
permission of the patentee or owner of the patent. Bloomer v. Mc-
Quewan, 14 How. 549. It is true that the privilege so granted ex- -
tends to the utmost limits of the United States, andis wholly inde-
pendent of the powers and jurisdiction of the several states. Patterson
v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Webber v. Virginia,103 U. S. 347; Agar
v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126. *But in permitting others to use the
patented thing, the owner of the patent, whether a corporation or a
V private person, is not exercising any federal right, privilege, or fran-
chise. r l
The right of the patent owner to permit or license the use of the
invention is not the creature of the federal franchise or statute, but
of the common law; and, in exercising this common·law right of
licensing others to use its patent, the corporation owner is no -more V
nationalized than a private owner would be under the same circum-
stances. The fact that a patent-holding corporation licenses others
to Tuse its patent in a particular state has no more effect and opera-
tion in domesticating it within such statelthan the same act on the
part of a private owner would render him a citizen and resident of
every state in which his patent might be used. The franchise right
of the patent-holding corporation in no way serves to establish the
fact thatlsuch corporation is carrying on its business, and is to be
found wherever its patent is used. A franchise cannot be distin-
guished from other property, and property held by a corporation
stands upon the same footing with that held by an individual. West
River Bridge C0. v. Dix, 6 How. 507. But, aside from this, it is well
settledthat neither the patent law, nor the privileges secured to pat-
entees thereunder, in any way enlarge, modify, or change theijudi-
ciary acts in respect to either the territorial jurisdiction of the federal ’
I