‘ 32 / FEDERAL Rmroarmx. r
they helpedothersv, and this created confusion and,.“growling"j about '
a division of ‘ the work. But, after all, these three libelants were
the crew, and did generally the work of the crew, and were treated as
, such all the waythrough. Tosuch an extent did this go that when
_Buzzard’s son, who acted as mate, became sick, Dove, one of the libel-*
ants, discharged that duty,_and it isa miserable pretext for Buzzard to
now say that Dove did this "a.s a personalfavor to himself.” The truth
is, they regarded themselves, as Buzzard did, as the schooner’s especial
crew, and he relied on them in thatcapacity, and while he did assume
. that Merriman was the responsible manager and the·one to pay all the
expenses, and ostentatiously kept that notion atloat,~there was never the
slightest circumstance to indicate thatithese three men did not occupy,
as they claim to do, the especial relation of seamenattaehed to the
schooner, and not belonging like the rest to the wrecking force, although
they were also to help in that work. Nor is there any reason growing
out of the terms of the contract to ·separate or apportion their work,
The managers did not;do this, and there is in the proof no basis for the
apportionment.; . They should have the lien for theircontract wages, and
Buzzard should look to his charterers or to Merriman & Fowler for reime
bursement for the wages so paid bythe ship. i- · . y jp ,;
There is abundant authority for this judgment. . Under the doctrine
of Leary v. U. S., 14 jWall. 607, and the cases like that, it might well.
be held, that»Buzzard remained the owner, and entirely responsible as
such. - He retained full possession and control over the navigation of the
vessel, accompanied ther as master,»and was, so; far as these men could
see or know, _as¤much· her owner and master as hehad been before, dur,
ing their service with him. * The charter-party only gave Merriman
“charge of said schooner in all cases, pertaining to the wrecking of the
steamer Algomar."- .This was only a very limited and qualified control, "
and it mayaamount to no more than a oontractfori the vessel’s service
under her own master and mate and a crew to be paidby the contractor.
That state of thingsicould not aitect the seamen’s lien for wages. Per—
— haps Buzzard would have been liable personally for any tortious collision
under Thorp v.»Hamm0nd, 12 Wall. 408. If so, he .would be likewise
liable for wages personally. H00e v. Groverlmcm, 1 Cranch, 214; Mar-
` r cardier v. Chesapeake Ins. C'0., 8 Cranch, 39.
_ But, beyond this relation. of ownership, and no matter who was the
owner, either general or specia1,Qunder this charter-party, the lien for
se.amen’s wages attached under the presumption of the maritime law, was
` never displaced, and could not be without the seamen’s express consent.
_ As Mr. District Judge Bmnanior says:
"It was necessary for the claimant to go further and show that the libel-
ants agreed to waive a lien upon the vessel and rely upon a personal credit
alone." The Sirocco, 7 Fed. Rep. 599.
t · ~ The learned judge states the principle most clearly in the following
extract: ’
"The presumption of the maritime law is that services performed by a sea.-
man on board a vessel are rendered upon the credit of the vessel, as well as