rms L. r.. umn. 33
that of the master and owners, and by that law seamen acquire a lieu for their
wages in allcases, unless it be made to appear that a waiver of the lien and
an exclusive personal credit formed part of the contract of hiring." Id.
Here,_as before stated, there is no pretense of this waiver, except by ,
implication from a knowledge of the charter-party and of a hi_ring by the
charterer. But a hiring by the owner does not constitute a waiver,
whether he be general owner or owner pro hac, and why should that by
acharterer have any other effect? i It takes something more to constitute
a waiver of the lien, and always that must be the purpose in view, for
no one ever waives or abandons a lien unless he does it with the inten- v
tion of doing that thing. The law sometimes implies the intention, no
doubt, but never from a circumstance that does not within itself neces-
sarily indicate that intention. Hence, the waiver of a seaman’s lien for
wages cannot be necessarily implied from the bare fact of hiring to a T
charterer any more than from the bare fact of hiring to the master or
owner. Certainly, not from the fact of hiring to an insolvent charterer
whom the master and owner would not trust without security. r
Again, says another learned judge: ` V
_"Supposing the libelants to be seamen, employed in the maritime service,
they have a lien on the vessel, whether she be sailed on shares or not. Their
knowing that she was so sailed can make no difference. Whoever is that
owner, the seamen have the vessel as security, and they are not bound to heed
arrangements made _with third persons." The Canton, 1 Spr. 437. —
The great case of Skolfield v.. Potter, 2 Ware, (Daveis,) 394, is conclu-
sive of this point, and also that it is a fraud upon the men not to inform
them specincally that they are to look alone to a third party; and, I may
add, if the owner or master knows that the third party isirresponsible,
it is equally a fraud not to inform them of that fact, as well.
' Nor is it understood that the cases like Webb v.,Petroe, 1. Curt.*104,
which recognize this superior status of the lien of a seaman for wages,
have at all affected this principle, because they hold that it does not
e extend to protect furnishers of supplies and other maritime licnholders.
This lien of the seaman for wages exists, too, quite beside any personal
liability of the_general owner; for, while he may not be liable in that
capacity, the vessel is, nevertheless, upon peculiar principles, liable in
rem to the seamen for their wages, whatever may be said of other liens
in that regard. Flaherty v. Doane, 1 Low. 150. Of course somebody
must be personally indebted for the wages, or there could be no lien
on the ship; but it is, as regards the lien, quite immaterial whether it
be the master or the general or special owner, who is indebted under
the contract; for the seamen may always look to the ship itself, unless
they willingly and knowingly waive that security by consenting to ac-
cept the personal liability of some one, and agree to contract solely upon
that credit. But this must be a matter of agreement explicitly ex-
pressed, OIT it may be necessarily implied, perhaps; yet, never a mere
inference from facts insuiiicient within themselves to demonstrate that
such was their intention and agreement. This is the rule to be ex-
tracted from the authorities, as I understand them. In The Hayhlander,
v.31r.no.1—3 v “