

condition of her bottom thus disclosed. The ship was not put on the dock, nor was such an examination of her tendered. This omission indicates to my mind that what was visible of the ship afforded just ground for the belief that such an examination would disclose an unsound bottom. No reason is suggested for omitting to dock the ship, except the expense. That reason appears to me to be an insufficient one, under the circumstances. The rejection of the ship by one insurance inspector was of itself so serious a matter for the ship that it seems to me that some other reason than the expense of docking the ship must have existed to cause the omission to tender that examination, that would have laid to rest all doubts as to the seaworthiness of the ship.

I have not overlooked the subsequent performance of the ship, but the question is not whether the ship would make the contemplated voyage in safety, but whether the condition of the ship was such as to justify the belief of competent persons that she was not in fit condition to be exposed to the hazards of the contemplated voyage.

If that be the question, it seems clear that the charterers were justified in rejecting the vessel, and the libel must be dismissed, with costs.

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THE CRAIGENDORAN.<sup>1</sup>

THE CLANDON.

BARTLETT and others *v.* THE CRAIGENDORAN.

SAME *v.* THE CLANDON.

(*District Court, E. D. New York. May 27, 1887.*)

1. WHARFAGE—HOW COMPUTED—TONNAGE OF VESSEL—REGISTERED TONNAGE.

The wharfage act of 1877 of the state of New York (Laws 1877, c. 315) regulates the rates of wharfage in New York and Brooklyn by the tonnage of the vessel. *Held*, that the tonnage so taken to calculate the wharfage is the registered, not the gross, tonnage.

2. SAME—BRITISH VESSELS.

The rule is the same for British vessels; the secretary of the treasury having by the treasury regulations of 1884, art. 182, directed that their tonnage shall be determined by reference to their certificate of registry.

In Admiralty.

*Goodrich, Deady & Goodrich*, for libellant.

*Whitehead, Parker & Dexter*, for claimants.

*Butler, Stillman & Hubbard*, for the Clandon.

BENEDICT, J. This is an action to recover wharfage for the use of a wharf in the city of Brooklyn. The rates of wharfage chargeable for the use of wharves in the city of Brooklyn and the city of New York are regulated by a statute of the state, enacted in 1877. The provision in the laws of the state now, and at the time in the libel mentioned, in

<sup>1</sup>Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.

force, is as follows (chapter 315, Laws 1877:) "It shall be lawful to charge and receive, within the cities of New York and Brooklyn and Long Island City, wharfage and dockage at the following rates, namely: \* \* \* From any vessel of two hundred tons burden and under, two cents per ton; and from every vessel over two hundred tons burden, two cents per ton for the first two hundred tons and one cent per ton for any additional ton." Under this statute, the question has arisen whether the tonnage of the ship so taken for the purpose of calculating her wharfage is the tonnage of the ship ascertained by measuring her in the manner prescribed by the laws of the United States in force at the time of the passage of the state law of 1877, or the tonnage ascertained by measuring her in the manner prescribed by the laws of the United States in force at the time of using the wharf.

This question is not free from difficulty; but on reflection, and upon considering the force of the expression of the supreme court, where it is said, "Evidently the word 'tonnage,' in commercial designation, means the number of tons burden the ship will carry as estimated and ascertained by the official admeasurement and computation prescribed by the public authority," and mindful of the fact that the measuring of a ship for the purpose of fixing her tonnage is required by law to be made by an officer of the United States, and that the method of measuring to be pursued by such officer is prescribed by law, and that the tonnage of the ship must be inserted in her register or enrollment, and the tonnage there stated must be that tonnage, and no other, which is ascertained by the officer, from a measurement made in the manner prescribed by law at the time of her registry or enrollment, and that consequently the only legal tonnage of the ship is the tonnage stated in her registry or enrollment, I am of the opinion that the words "tons burden," as used in the wharfage act of 1877, above quoted, should be held to mean the registered tonnage of the ship, and not her gross tonnage. No method by which to ascertain the tonnage of a ship for the purpose of calculating her wharfage is provided by the state statute, and all ships are required by law to carry a register in which the tonnage is stated. The fair presumption is that it was the intention of the statute that reference to the ship's register should be made for the purpose of calculating her wharfage, and not to leave the tonnage to be a matter of private calculation and open to dispute.

In this instance the vessel is a British vessel; but that fact makes no difference, for, under the statute of 1882, the secretary of the treasury is authorized to direct that the tonnage of foreign vessels be that described in their certificates of registry or other national papers; and, by article 182 of the treasury regulations of 1884, the secretary has directed that the tonnage of vessels of Great Britain shall be determined by reference to their certificate of registry.

In accordance with these views, the wharfage recoverable in this case must be calculated on the registered tonnage of the ship, which is admitted to be 943 tons, at the rate of two cents per ton for the first 200 tons and one cent per ton for every additional ton.

THE IDA MEYER.<sup>1</sup>

## TAYLOR v. THE IDA MEYER.

(District Court, E. D. New York. May 19, 1887.)

## SEAMAN'S WAGES—CANAL BOATMAN—LIEN—STEAM-BOAT.

Libelant was employed to work on claimant's canal-boats. These canal-boats were propelled by claimant's steam-boat, and libelant did some slight work on her. This action was brought against the steam-boat to recover for services rendered generally by the libelant. *Held*, that the relation between the canal-boats and the steam-boat was not such as to make the canal-boats a part of the steam-boat, and to charge the steam-boat with a lien for labor performed on the canal-boats.

In Admiralty

A. B. Stewart, for libelant.

Hyland &amp; Zabriskie, for claimants.

BENEDICT, J. This is an action to enforce a lien for wages against the steam canal-boat *Ida Meyer*. The evidence shows that the claimant owned the steam canal-boat *Ida Meyer*, and also two canal-boats. The canal-boats were employed by the claimant in the freight business, and, when on the Erie canal, they were towed by the steam-boat, instead of being towed by horses. The libelant was employed to work for the claimant as a hand on the canal-boats. When the engagement was made, no reference was made to the *Ida Meyer*, nor did the libelant engage to perform any duty on board the *Ida Meyer*. The substantial parts of the service sued for were performed on board the canal-boats, although there is evidence that the libelant did for a short time steer the steam-boat. The services performed on board the steam-boat were, however, too insignificant to demand notice here. The decision of the case depends on the question whether the relation between the canal-boats and the steam-boat was such as to make the canal-boats a part of the steam-boat, so as to charge the steam-boat with a lien for labor performed on the canal-boats. This position the libelant is forced to take because of the provision in section 4251 of the Revised Statutes, where it is enacted that "no canal-boat, registered or licensed, which is required to be registered and licensed, or enrolled and licensed, shall be subject to be libeled in any of the United States courts for the wages of any person who may be employed on board thereof in navigating the same." In support of this position, reference is made to the following authorities: *Amis v. The Louisa*, 9 Mo. 629; *Gliem v. The Belmont*, 11 Mo. 112; *The Kentucky v. Brooks*, 1 G. Greene, 398; *The Dick Keys*, 1 Biss. 408; and *The Sydney*, 27 Fed. Rep. 119.

I find in none of these cases authority that will justify me in deciding that the steam-boat proceeded against is subject to lien for the wages of

<sup>1</sup> Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.