sroox·ro;~;. v. BALTIMORE & ir. Y. R. co. _15
gitimate purposes. What right of the state would be invaded? The
corporation thus employed, orernpowered, in executing the will of con-
gress, could do nothing which the state oouldpightfully oppose or ob- `
ject to. It may be added that no state corporation more suitable than
the defendant could be empowered to build the bridge in question in
this case, since one-half of the bridge is in the state of New York, and
the railroad of the defendant is to connect with it on_the New York side.
_ In our judgment, if, congress itself has the power to construct a bridge
across a navigable stream for the furtherance of commerce among the
states,it may authorize the same to be done by agents, whether individ-
uals, or a corporation created by itself, or a state corporation already
existing and concerned in the enterprise. _The objection that congress
cannot confer powers on a state corporation is untenable. It has used
` their agency for carrying on its own purposes from an early period. It
adopted as posbroads the turnpikes belonging to the various tumpike A
corporations of the country, as far back as such corporations were known,
and subjected them to burdens, and accorded to them privileges, arising
, out of that relation. It continued the same system with regard to
canals and railroads, when these modes of transportation came into ex-
istence. Nearly half a century ago, it constituted every railroad built,
or to be built, in the United States, a post—road. This, of course, in-
volved duties, and conferred privileges and powers, not contained in
their original charter. In 1866, congress authorized every steam-1·ail-
road company in the United States to carry passengers and goods on
their way from one state to another, and to receive compensation there-
for, and to connect with roads of other states, soas to form continuous
lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination. The
powers thus conferred were independent of the powers conferred by the
charter of any railroad company. Surely these acts of congress cannot
be condemned as unconstitutional exertions of power. _
In the present case the corporate capacity of theiStaten Island Rapid
Transit Railroad Company is admitted by making it a defendant. It is
not excluded- from the state by any want of comity in the laws of the state. _
Its alleged want of power under those laws to build the bridge in ques-
tion, doesnot arise from anything peculiar to it as a,foreign corporation,
‘ but from the general prohibition of the state law of April 6, 1886, which
is applicable to all persons and corporations, andjdeclares "that no bridge,
s viaduct, orefixed structure shall. be created by any person or corporation
over or in any part of thenavigable waters separating this state from
other states,-where the tide ebbs and flows, without express permission `
of the legislature of this state, given by statutes for that purpose.-" This
prohibition, in its broadestsense, inhibits the erection of such a bridge
as is described therein, by congress itself, or (which is the same thing)
by any person or corporation acting under the authority of congress, and,
of course, is to that extent void, if congress has power to erect such a .
bridge. But if it isnot to be taken in this broad sense, but as subject
to the condition in law of _being inoperative as against the paramount
power of congress, then the authority of the defendant is unaffected by