srocxrou v. Bxrrmonn & N. Y. 12. co. 17
which the structures are made. If this is so, then the power of regula-
tion in congress is not supreme; it depends on the will of the states.
We do not concur in this view. We think that the power of congress is
supreme over the whole subject, unimpeded and unembarrassed by state
lines or state laws; that, in this matter, the country is one, and the work
to be accomplished is national; and that state interests, state jealousies,
and state prejudices do not require to be consulted. In matters of for-
eign and interstate commerce there are no states.
It is very true that in some cases of bridges authorized to be erected,
and other things authorized to be done, congress may have required that
the consent of the state should be first obtained. But the power of the
United States cannot depend on the consent of the states; it is only to
be found in the constitution. The consent of `a state may sometimes
facilitatethe execution of a power, as the consent to the use of the pris-
ons, court-houses, and other public buildings of the state; but it can never
confer pow`er. Particular states have sometimes consented to the em-
ployment of their courts and judicial machinery by the oflicers of the
United States for condemningland for public purposes. But, if the
United States had no power to take land by condemnation, such consent
could not give it. So where, in any case, congress may have authorized V
the construction of a railroad or a bridge upon the condition of obtain-
ing the consent of the state, it is clear that such consent was not re-
quired for the purpose of supplementing the power of congress to author- '
ize the structure to be made, but rather for the purpose of manifesting
a disposition of comity and good-will towards the state. For, if con- `
gress had not the power _to authorize the structure, consent could not give
it. All those cases, therefore, in which congress has given such author-
ity, whether with or without the consent of the state, are precedents for
afiirming the power of congress. They are all instances of practical con-
struction of the constitution in favor of it.
The most strenuous objection, however, to the exercise of the power `
in this case, and in the manner proposed, is based on the fact that the
piers of the bridge are to rest, and the bridge is to stand, on land which
belongs to the state, and that no compensation is proposed to be made
for the taking thereof. It is contended that, if the land of the state can .
be taken at all, (which is denied,) it can, at most, only be taken, like i
other private property, after just compensation has been made.
First, it is denied that the land of the state can be taken at all without
voluntary cession, or consent of the state legislature. If this is so, we
are brought back to the dilemma of requiring the consent of the state in
, almost every case of an interstate line of communication by railroad, for
hardly a case can arise in which some property belonging to a state will
not be crossed. It will always be so at the passage of a navigable stream.
This shows that the position cannot be sound, for it brings us to a rc-
ductab ad absurdum. It interposes an effectual barrier to the execution
of a constitutional power vested in congress. It overlooks the fun-
· damental principle that the constitution, and all laws made in pursu-
ance thereof, are the supreme law of the land; for, if the consent of a
v.32F.no.1——2 V