. STOCKTON rv. mnrrmonm at N. Y. n. co. 19
the limits ofthe Union, to the concurrent jurisdiction of both govern-
ments; thatof the United States being supreme. The laws of the latter
are supreme everywhere, in the states as well as in the territories of the
United States; but have exclusive force, within the states, only in such U
places as have been ceded by them. ` ` ` ·
The argument based upon the doctrine that the states have the emi-
nent domain or highest dominion in the lands comprised within their
limits, and that the United States have no dominion in such lands, can-
, not avail to frustrate the supremacy given by the constitution to the
government of the United States in all matters within the scope of its
sovereignty. This is not at matter of words, but of things. If it islnec-
essary that the United States government shouldrhave an eminent do-
main still higher than that of the state, in order that it may fully carry
out the objects and purposes of the constitution, then it has it. What-
ever may be the necessities or conclusions of theoretical law as to em-
inent domain or anything else, it must be received as a postulate of the
. constitution that the government of the United States is invested with
full and complete power toexecute and carry out its purposes. And
. as oneof these purposes is the regulation of commerce among the several
states, andjas that involves the needs and ways of intercommunication,
it follows that congress may provide for these necessities whether the
states co-operate and concur therein or not. · -
’ But, seéimdly, it is contended that if the United States can constitu-
_ tional1y take' the land of the state, as well as that of· the citizen, for pub-
lic purposes, without consent, it can only do so in the same manner,
and subject to the same conditions, namely, that of making just compensa-
tion. It is urged that the language of the fifth amendment of the con-
stitution is applicable to the case, and is imperative. This language is
"nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compen-
sation." It is insisted that the property of the state in lands under its
navigable waters is privateproperty, and comes strictly within the con-
stitutional provision. It is significantly asked, can the United States
take the state·house at Trenton, and the surrounding grounds belonging
to the state, and appropriatethem to the purposes of a railroad depot, or
to any other use of the general government, without compensation? We
· do not apprehend that the decision of the present case involves or re-
quires a serious answer to this question. The cases are clearly not par-
allel. The character of the title or ownership by which the state holds
the state-house is quite different from that by which it holds the land
under the navigable waters in and around itsterritory.
The information rightly states that, prior to the Revolution, the shore
and landsunderwater of the navigable streams and waters of the prov-
ince of New Jersey belonged to the king of Great Britain as part of the
jam ·rega,Zj£a of the crown, and devolved to the state by right of conquest.
’ The information does not state,'however, what is equally true, that, after
the conquest, the said lands were held by the state, as they were by the
king, in trust ° for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and the
erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons, and other facil-