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20 FEDERAL Raronrnn.
ities of navigation and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they
were publici jam; in other words, they were held for the use of the peo-
ple at large. It is true that to utilize the fisheries, especially those
of shell-fish, it was necessary to parcel them out to particular operators,
, and employ the rent or consideration for the benefit of the whole people;
but this did not alter the character of the title. The land remained sub-
ject to all other public uses as before, especially to those of navigation
and commerce, which are always paramount to those of public fisheries.
. It is also true that portions of the submerged shoals and flats, which
really interfered with navigation, and could better subserve the purposes
of commerce by being filled up and reclaimed, were disposed of to in-
dividuals for that purpose. But neither did these dispositions of use-
less parts affect the character of the title to the remainder.
Such being the character of the state’s ownership ofthe land under
water,-an ownership held, not for the purpose of emolument, but for
public use, especially the public use of navigation and commerce,-the
question arises whether it is a kind of property susceptible of pecuniary
- compensation, within the meaning ofthe constitution. ,The Hfth amend- S
ment provides only that private property shall not be taken without com-
pensation; making no reference to public property. But, if the phrase
V may have an application broad enough to include all property and own-
ership, the question would still arise whether the appropriation of a few
, square feet of the river bottom to the foundation of a bridge which is to
be used for the transportation of an extensive commerce in aid and relief of
that afforded bythe water-way, is at all a diversion of the property from
its original public use. It is not so considered when sea—walls,, piers,
wing-dams, and other structures are erected for the purpose of aiding com-
merce by improving and preserving the navigation. Why should it be
deemed such when (without injury tothe navigation) erections are made
for the purpose of aiding and enlarging commerce beyond the capacity
, of the navigable stream itself, and of all the navigable waters of the coun-
try? It is commerce, and not navigation, which is the great object of
constitutional care.
The power to regulate commerce is the basis of the power to regulate
navigation, and navigable waters and streams, and these are so completely
subject tothe control of congress, as subsidiary to commerce, that it has
become usual to call the entire navigable waters of the country the navi-
gable waters of the United States. It matters little whether the United
States had or has not the theoretical ownership and dominion in the
waters, or the land under them; it bas, what is more, the regulation and
control of them for the purposes of commerce. S0 wide and extensive
is the operation of this power that no state can place any obstruction in
or upon anynavigable waters against the will of congress, and congress
may summarily remove such obstructions at its pleasure. And all this
power is derived from the power "to regulate commerce." Is this power
stayed when it comes to the question of erecting a bridge for the pur-
poses of commerce across a navigable stream? We think not. We think
that the power to regulate commerce between the states extends, not only