mAs*rMAN v. ooumw or cLAc1cAMAs. 29
satisfied out of the property of any one of the men of Devon, and the
result would be "an infinity of actions" among the defendants for con-
tribution. This was in fact an action against an unorganized mass.
An English county was not a corporation. It had no board or court
which stood for the inhabitants and administered their local adairs. It
had no power of taxation, and therefore had no corporate fund. It was
» merely a convenient division of the kingdom, comprising a number of
quasi corporations, such as parishes, hundreds, or wapentakes, for judi-
cial and— representative purposes, in which the king, in his executive
, character, was represented by the vice·comes, or sheriff, on whom, in
process of time, the civil administration was almost wholly devolved.
1 Bl. Comm. 116, 339; Whart. Law Diet. "County."
The duty of keeping the highways, including the bridges thereon, in
repair, devolved on the parishes in which they were. It was accom-
plished by means of a tax on the property and persons of the parish,
paid either in labor or money, and applied under the direction of the
surveyor of ways. By the act of 22 Hen. VIII. c. 5, this burden,
in the case of bridges outside of any town, was devolved on the county
at large; the justices of the county, or any three of them, being author-
ized to cause the repairs to be made at the expense of the inhabitants.
thereof; and this undoubtedly was the condition of the bridge in Russell
v. Men of Devon. The inhabitants of the county had no authority to repair
the bridge, or to raise means to do it with, any more than the inhabi-
tants of one of our road-districts. They were only bound to contribute
, labor or money for that purpose, as they were required by the justices.
1 Bl. Comm. 357; Shear. & R. Neg. § 248.
Followingthe case of Russell v. Men of Devon, or the provisions of their
own statutes, most of the American courts have held that a county is not
liable in damages for an injury sustained by any one in consequence of
failing to keep in repair a highway or bridge, while they have been gen-
erally agreed that a town incorporated under a special statute or charter, ·
with authority over the streets and bridges within its limits, and the
power to raise money by taxation for that purpose, is so liable, unless
otherwise provided by statute. Dill. Mun. Corp. (2d Ed.) § 785 ; Ran-
kin v. Buckman, 9 Or. 253. .
The reason given for this distinction-that the inhabitants of a town
incorporated under a special statute consent thereto, while a county ex-
ists, without the consent of its inhabitants, simply as a subdivision of
the state-shows that it is a distinction without any substantial diifer-
ence. 4
In 1 Thomp. Neg. 618, the author, after premising that the ground
of the judgment in Russell v. Men of Devon is not sound when applied to
counties in the western states, says: ’
" These counties are political bodies, having a common administrative board,
elected by voters of the county, by which the business of the county is trans-
acted. “ Through this board the county contracts and is contracted with, sues
and is sued. .Many counties issue negotiable securities in large amounts.
Their administrative boards possess a limited power of taxation for county