_ EASTMAN,_i.}._COUl}{'lQY or CLACKAMAS. QL
act'or_romission" of said county, which was continued in force ade: the-
adoption of the constitution by section 7 of article 18 thereof; and by
section 347 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which took effect on June 1,
1863, lt was re-enacted andcontinued with some verbal alterations.
On February 21, 1887, an act was passed, entitled “An act to amend,
section 347 of title 4 of chapter 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relat~ _
ing to actions by and against public corporations and officers," which
restraius the right to maintain an action against a county to cases aris-
ing on contract. Objection is made to the constitutionality of the act,
because th-e subject is not expressed in the title, as provided in section
20 of article 4 of the constitution. It may be admitted that thereis no
 uch act as that described in the title to this one. But "section 347 of
title 4 of chapter 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to actions by
and against public corporations and officers," is in legal eifect simply see-
tion 347. of such Code. The superfluous matter neither helps nor hurts
it. Thisfaction was commenced on November 15, 1886, and on Febru-
ary 7, 1887, a demurrer to the complaint was overruled; and the act
amending section 347 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so as to leave this
class of actions unprovided for, followed on February 21st, thereafter.
Andtnow it iscontended by. counsel for the defendant that the effect
of this act is to take away plaintitI"s right of action, and therefore this
action can no longer be maintained. On the other hand, counsel for the .
plaintirli contends (1) that, as there is no mention in the amendment e of 4
pending actions or existing rights of action, it ought not to be construed ’
to operate retrospectively, so as to aiiect them; and (2) that the right to
maintainthis action is a vested one, which the legislature cannot take
away. . · ` J . ·
The fourteenth amendment declares that the state "shall not deprive
any person of _* ' * property without due process of law." As-
‘ suming, as I do for the present, that the plaintiEt"s right of action,
whether vested ornot, is not "property," within the meaning of this
amendment, there is nothing in the constitution of the United States or
of this stateaprohibitingthe passage of retrospective laws by the latter,
provided they do not impair the obligation of contracts, or partake of
the character of ex post facto laws. Subject to these qualifications, the
state may pass retrospective laws, and thereby divest vested rights, with- _
out violating the constitution of the United States. Watson v. Mercer,
8 Pet. 110; Oltarles. River Bridge v. Warren River Bridge, 11 Pet. 539;,
Carpenter v. Com., 17 How. 461; Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall., 172;
Cooley, Const. Lim. 370. And the state constitution goes no further in
this respect than to prohibit the passage of laws impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts or export facto laws,—·such as affect retrospectively crimes
or their punishment. Const. Or. art. 1, § 21. ( _ »
· . This is a" civil action to recoverdamages for a tort; and a law aifecting
the right to maintain it, or taking it away, neither impairs the obligae
tion of a contract, nor partakes of the character of an ex post facto law.
And admitting that the right to maintain this or an equivalent action for
the redress of this wrong is a vested one, of which the plaintiff ought not