EASTMAN rv. c0U1~:*rY oF CLACKAMAB. 33
In ‘Hel?nwrc v. Shafer, 2·’Show.-16, a case cited with approbation by
Lord MANSFIELD in Couch   J@-ies, 4 Burrows, 2460, and by Mr. Chief
Justice KENT in Dash v. Van Kleeck, supra, it was held, in an action
brought after June 24, 1677, on a" parol promise made before that time,
that the same was not within the statute of frauds and perjuries of 29. Car.
II, c. 3, § 4, which enacts " that from and after June 24, 1677, no ac-
tion shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any agreement
made upon consideration of marriage, unless such agreement, or some
memorandum thereof, shall be in writing." The court said "that the
act could not have a retrospect to take away an action to which the plain-
_ tiff was before entitled." ' I · . t- ,
Upon this point counsel for the defendant cite and rely on the cases
of Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill,- 324, and Iron O0. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327, in
the former of which it was decided that the right of a judgment creditor-
under a particular statute to redeem from a mortgage sale, at any time-
within a year therefrom, may be lessened by a statute passed after such jj
right was acquired, but which left a reasonable time thereafter in which _)
such redemption might be. made. This is nothing more than the famil-
iar rule that a statute of limitations may be made applicable to- existing
causes of action, provided a reasonable time thereafter is allowed in
which to commence action thereon. In the course of the opinion, how-
ever, Judge Cowan, as usual, discusses a good many cognate questions,
and among other things says (1) that where a statute repeals another
which imposed a penalty, the right tothe penalty becomes extinguished,
even though a prosecution therefor has been commenced; (2) inchoate
rights, derived under a statute, are lost by its repeal, unless saved by
express words; (3) but it is not so with civil rights that may stand in-
dependent of the statute, or have ceased to be executory and become
executed; and (4) positive statutes, not merely repealing ones, should
not be construed so as to interfere _with previously existing contracts or
rights of action, unless the intent to do so is expressed therein. -
In the case of Iron C0. v. Pwrce it was held that the repeal of a highly
penal statute which made the officers of a corporation, in case they' ‘
neglected to make certain reports, individually liable for all corporate
debts contracted while they were such officers, whether the creditor _
was thereby injured or not, took away all existing rights of action there-
under, including one on which an action was brought-before the passage
nf the repealing act. It is admitted that in the case of what are called
penal statutes there has been a more marked disposition on the part iof `
the courts to hold that a repeal thereof destroys or takes away all exist-
ing rights0f action thereunder without any express declarationto that
p effect. But the rule is an arbitrary one, and never had anything to
commend it, except in the United States an undue sympathy for wrong-
doers, and in England an early prejudice among common—law judges
against "statutc-made law." By act of February 25, 1871, (16 St. 432;
Rev. St. § 13,) congress abrogated it, and declared that "thc rcpealof
any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty,
forfeiture or liability, incurred under such statute, unless the repealing
v.32F.no.1——3