i PLINSKY v. GERQMANIA F. & M. ms. co. 49
and to infer, without an express provision or necessary implication aris-
ing out of the contract itself or public policy demanding it, that the in-
sured surrendered all right to make the usual changes of or additions to
her property as its safety or her convenience or comfort might suggest,
is a construction too rigorous to be rational. May, Ins. 247; Jolly v.
Equitable Soc., 1 Har. & G. 295; Shaw v. Robberds, 6 Adol. & E. 75.
Within the literalism of the policy, the transfer of any portion of the
goods from the first floor to the basement would be an increase of risk,
and would avoid the policy, if the theory of the plaintiff be true that
such removal of the entire stock had this effect. Wood, Ins. § 238. ,
There is much force,· too, in the suggestion that there was no evidence
of an increase of risk by the removal of this stock to the basement.
The only testimony tending in that direction was that, by the removal
to the basement, the goods became second-hand goods. This would not,
of itself, increase the risk of an accidental burning; for it was not pre-
tended that the goods were not as safe in the basement as upon the first
floor. Conceding that it would increase the temptation to a fraudulent
destruction of the property, it may well be replied that the company
did not insure against such fraudulent destruction. Upon the theory of
the- defendant, the insolvency of the plaintiff or the suspension of her
business in any way would depreciate her stock, or, to use the words of
the witness, "make it second-hand goods," and thus operate to increase
the·risk of its fraudulent destruction. Upon this theory, the insolvency
of a merchant would at once invalidate every policy of insurance upon
his goods. It seems to us that the increase of risk contemplated by the
policy was the introduction of new and hazardous goods, new or un-
usual methods of heating or lighting, or some other means which sub-
jected the goods to an additional danger of an accidental nre. _
2. The second objection is that the court admitted testimony that fire-
works were usually kept in stocks of confectionery and toys, and hence
that -the keeping of such fire-works did not avoid the policy, notwith-
standing its provision that it should "cease and determine if * * *
fire-works shall be kept, temporarily or otherwise, in the stocks of mer-
chandise * * * insured herein." This provision, too, must be
construed in connection with the written portion of the policy, which
A insured “ her stock of candies, confectionery, toys, fruit, and all such
other stock as is usually kept for sale in confectionery stores." The rule
in such cases is well settled that, if the prohibited article be usually
kept in the stock insured, the written part of the policy shall control the
printed portion, and the keeping of the prohibited article will not avoid ·
the policy. The Massachusetts cases are the other way, but the law is
too firmly settled to be disturbed. Wood, Fire Ins. 169, 170.
In this connection the case of Steinbach v. Insurance Oo. , 13 Wall. 183,
was relied upon by the defendant. This was a suit upon a fire policy
upon a stock of fancy goods, toys, and other articles "oontained in the
brick building," etc., "and now in his occupancy as a German jobber
and importer, privileged to keep {ire-crackers on sale." The insured
not only kept fire—crackers on sale, but fire-works, which were classed as
v.32r.no.1—4