2 FEDERAL REPORTER.
Wnnmacm, J. This suitis-brought to enforce the specific performance
. of a contract between the parties of the date of March 21, 1885, by which
the complainant agreed to sell, and- rthe defendant to buy, certain real
estate, with a dwelling-house thereon fronting on Mount Vernon street,
formerly Olive street, Boston, for the sum of $50,000, to be paid in cash
on delivery of the deed; $$1,000 of the consideration money having been
paid at the time of making the contract. The contract contained the
following clause: "Conveyance to be made by a good and sufiicient deed,
giving clear title from all incumbrances on or before the fifteenth day of
April next ensuing; sale subject, to restriction against building beyond
the present front line of the house; title to be good or the sale void."
The time for executing the conveyance was extended by the mutual un~
' derstanding of the parties, and had not expired April 23, 1885; and on
' that day the defendant by letter notified the complainant that he should
recede from the purchase, and expect the return of the $1,000, because
of a defect in the title to the real, estate consisting of "a condition im—
posed by the deed of Jonathan Mason to Charles Bulfinch, dated Octo-
— ber 19, 1805, also imposed by a number of succeeding conveyances."
The deed from Mason to Bulfinch describes the premises in question as
alot of landffsituateron Mount Vernon, westward of the estate of H. G.
Otis, Esq.,·" and conveys the land by metes and bounds, and contains
the following clause: "Pi·ovided,·and upon condition, that no building
shall ever be erected upon said premises nearer to Olive street than said
Otis’ house now stands`? »Bu1finch_`conveyed the premises to Humph-
reys by a deed dated February 10, 1806, which contained this language:
" Provided, and this deed is upon condition, that no building shall ever
be erected upon such premises nearer to Olive street than the house of
H. G. Otis now,stands." In several subsequent deeds conveying the
same premises the words "upon condition " were omitted, but the words
° "provided that," etc., were retained. The deed to the complainant’s
testator, bearing date June 5, 1858, contained this recital: "The pren1—-
ises being subject to a condition that no building shall be erected nearer
to Mount Vernon street than the house formerlyof Harrison Gray Otis
now stands." Several defenses to the action have been urged; but the
conclusion which has been reached makes it unnecessary to consider
whether there areany grounds for denying specific performance of the
contract other than that upon which the defendant placed his refusal to
complete the purchase in his letter of April 23d. `
The principles which control actions for specific] performance are fa-
miliar, and, so far as they are applicable to the present controversy, can
be briefly' stated. Equity will notdecree specific performance of a con-
tract to purchase real estate, when the decree would compel the defend-
ant to accept a doubtful title. The purchaser is entitled to a marketable
'title. He is not justified in refusing to perform the contract because a
fanciful or speculative doubt may be suggested of its validity. But a
title open to a reasonable doubt is not a marketable one; and unless the
defect belongs to the category of those in which substantial justice can
_ be done by allowing compensation to the purchaser, and decreeing per-