

question becomes one of construction, as applied to the known facts in the business; in other words, the vessel should have been kept in the coolest of passages that those engaged in the trade were accustomed to keep. It seems to me clear that the cool passages those engaged in the trade usually took were to the north, or just south, of the Azores, and from thence to the southern point of the Great Banks; and that the John H. Pearson, by not taking this course, violated an express provision in the charter-party. In either view of the construction put upon these words, "the northern passage," by the supreme court, I am of opinion that the libelants have made out their case upon the evidence, and that a decree should be entered in their favor.

THE WM. KRAFT.

SNOWDEN *et al.* v. HODGSON *et al.*

(District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania. January 13, 1888.)

COLLISION WITH PIER—TUG AND TOW—UNSAFE CONDITION OF TOW—KNOWLEDGE OF RISK.

A tow-boat, having a tow in charge, attempted to run past the piers of a bridge on a bad night, and in a high wind. The tow collided with one of the piers, and sunk. The impingement, however, was so slight that if the tow had been in good order no serious mischief would have ensued. When the trip was undertaken it was known to both the owners of the tow and the master of the tow-boat that the tow was unfit to encounter the hazards of the trip. *Held*, that negligence was imputable to both parties, and but half damages were recoverable by the owners of the tow.

In Admiralty.

Libel by C. L. Snowden & Co. against Henry M. Hodgson and others, late owners of the tow-boat The Wm. Kraft, to recover damages for negligent towage, causing loss of libelant's boat.

Knox & Reed, for libelants.

Isaac S. Van Voorhis, for respondents.

ACHESON, J. It has been held that it is negligence in both the owner of the tow and the master of the tug to proceed on a voyage with a tow known to both to be unfit to encounter the hazards of the trip, and, in case of the loss of the tow due to such concurrent negligence, the damages should be equally divided between the parties. *Mason v. The Wm. Murtaugh*, 3 Fed. Rep. 404; *The Wm. Cox*, 9 Fed. Rep. 672; *Connolly v. Ross*, 11 Fed. Rep. 342; *The Bordentown*, 16 Fed. Rep. 270. A careful consideration of the proofs in this case has brought me to the conclusion that this principle is justly applicable here. The libelants' flat-boat was very old,—well nigh worn out,—and had been sided up to hold a cargo of nut-coal, with which it was loaded deep down in the water; and it was leaking badly. These facts were known to Brown, the master of the Wm.

Kraft, and to Sloan, the engineer and one of the owners of the boat. They both hesitated to take the flat-boat in charge because they considered it hazardous to undertake to tow it in its bad condition. The Wm. Kraft hitched to the flat-boat after dark, about 8 or 9 o'clock. Sloan says: "The night was very windy and bad." The risky condition of the flat-boat was fully known to the libelants, or at least to their agent, Livingston, who delivered it to the tow-boat. I think it clear that the immediate cause of the sinking of the flat-boat was its collision with the pier of the Redstone bridge. But the impingement was so slight that if the flat-boat had been staunch and in good order, it is not at all likely that any serious mischief would have ensued. Indeed, the unfit condition of the tow contributed directly to the disaster. But then, on the other hand, as the master of the Wm. Kraft had undertaken to tow a flat-boat known to be so tender as not to be able to endure knocks which would not hurt sound vessels, it was his duty to exercise care commensurate with the necessities of the occasion, and he should not have attempted to run past the piers of the bridge on a bad night, and in a high wind. *The Mohler*, 21 Wall. 230:

The alleged agreement that the flat-boat should be towed at the risk of the owners is not satisfactorily established. This is not set up in the answer, and neither Brown nor Sloan testifies to any such agreement or understanding. This defense, urged at the hearing, rests exclusively upon the unsupported recollection of two bystanders, Province and Swaine, as to the language which (they say) Sloan used in his conversation with Livingston when the flat was taken in tow. But the proofs in the whole do not sustain this defense.

As there was a necessity to remove the wreck out of the channel of the river, I think the cost thereof is a proper item of claim here. Correcting, then, the mistake admitted to exist in the libelants' bill, the damages are as follows. viz.:

Number of bushels of nut coal, - - - - -	6,100
Contract price per bushel, (including flat-boat,) - - - - -	7 cts.
	<hr/>
	\$427 00
Deduct for towage and tolls, - - - - -	31 16
	<hr/>
	\$395 84
Add cost of removing wreck, - - - - -	177 92
	<hr/>
Total damages, - - - - -	\$573 76

The libelants are entitled to a decree for one-half of the damages, viz., \$286.88, with interest thereon from the date of suit. The unexplained delay in suing justly deprives the libelants of interest from the date of the loss.

Let a decree be drawn in accordance with this opinion.

DANIEL v. BROWN *et al.*

(Circuit Court, D. Colorado. February 17, 1888.)

1. FRAUD—PURCHASE OF MINING PROPERTY—CONCEALMENT.

Plaintiff alleged in his bill that defendants, having discovered rich ore in a mine partly owned by him, fraudulently concealed this fact from his agent and co-owner, and thereby induced him to sell plaintiff's interest in the mine for much less than its value, at the same time purchasing the agent's interest in the same mine for a sum certain, with the promise of additional compensation to the agent, conditioned on the value of the ore they might take out. *Held*, that these facts, if proved, would avoid the deed.

2 SAME.

In a suit to set aside a deed of mining property on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's evidence, on motion for a receiver and an injunction, showed that defendants had discovered ore on the mine before they bought plaintiff's interest in the mine from his agent, but he did not clearly prove that this discovery had been concealed from his agent, and failed to prove, as alleged in his bill, that defendants agreed to pay the agent additional compensation for his own interest in the mine, which they had also bought, conditioned on the value of the ore they might take out. The agent received a larger proportional price for his own interest in the mine than that he obtained for plaintiff. *Held*, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the motion.

In Equity. On motion for injunction and receiver.

This was a suit brought by George M. Daniel against David R. C. Brown, Elmer T. Butler, James M. Downing, John C. Eames, George H. Hewitt, J. F. Downing, and J. C. Bates to set aside certain conveyances. The bill alleges that plaintiff authorized one Thomas Bracken to sell plaintiff's half interest in a certain mine for the best price he could obtain, not less than \$5,000; that defendants Brown, Butler, Eames, and Downing discovered a large body of valuable ore on this mine, and, fraudulently concealing this discovery from Bracken, induced him to sell to defendant Hewitt, for their benefit, plaintiff's half interest in the mine for \$5,000; that, at the same time, they purchased Bracken's quarter interest in the same mine for \$3,000, and the promise of a larger sum, conditioned upon the value of the ore they might take out; and that defendants had taken \$250,000 worth of ore from the mine.

C. J. Hughes, for plaintiff.

Patterson & Thomas and *J. B. Beljord*, for defendants.

HALLETT, J. I think the bill in this case states facts which, if supported by evidence, would call for the relief which the plaintiff demands, and the question whether the plaintiff be entitled to any such orders as he now asks for turns upon the evidence. I think the evidence tends to prove that ore was discovered in this mine by Mr. Eames before the contract was made for the purchase of the property. I do not attach much weight to the circumstance that Mr. Bracken got more for his interest in the property, in proportion to the amount of his interest, than that which was given to the plaintiff. It often happens, among tenants in common, that one asks more for his interest in the property than is obtained by another, and, according to my observation, those who own small inter-