4 FEDERAL Rnronrnn.
(section 493, Eq. Jur.,) "stand upon any notion of mutual contract, ex-
press or implied, between the sureties toiindemnify each other in pro- »
portion; but it arises from principles of equity, independent of contract."
In Stirling v. Forrester, 3 Bligh, 590, Lord Rmnmsnam said:
" The principle established in the case of Bering v. Lord WincheZ.s·ea,` 1
Cox, 318, is universal, that the right and duty of contribution is founded in
doctrines of equity. It does not depend upon contract. If several persons
are indebted, and one makes the payment, the creditor is bound in conscience,
if not by contract, to give to the party paying the debt all his remedies against
thel other debtors. The cases of averages in equity rest upon the same prin-
c1p e." · · (
Where the legal remedy is adequate, a court of law has concurrent ju-
risdiction with that of a court of equity in cases of contribution. " But
- still," says Story, (section 496, Eq. J ur. ,) "the jurisdiction now assumed
in courts of law upon this subject in no manner affects that originally
and intrinsically belonging to equity. Indeed there are many cases in
' which the relief is more complete and effectual. in equity than it can be
at law ; as, for instance, where an account and discovery are wanted, or
where there are numerous parties in interest, which would occasion a
multiplicity of suits. In some cases the remedy at law is now utterly
inadequate; as, if there are several sureties, and one is insolvent, and an-
other pays the debt, he can, at law, recover from the other solvent sure-
ties only the same share as he could if all were solvent. Thus, if there
are four sureties, and one is insolvent, a solvent surety who pays the
whole debt can recover only one-fourth part thereof (and not a third
part) against the other tw_o solvent parties. But in a court of equity he
will be entitled to recover one~third part of the debt against each of them;
for in equity the insolvent’s share is apportioned among all the other solv-
ent sureties. Where two are bound for the payment of a specinc sum,
and one pays the whole, jhecan, either in law or in equity, call upon the
other to contribute, and thus recover a moiety of what he had,paid."
Will. Eq. Jur. 107. See, also, 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 1416, 1418, 1419,
and notes.; This being the law on the subject of jurisdiction in equity
in cases of this character, it follows that the complainant could properly
file his bill on the equity side of the court, to enforce contribution by his
co-surety, the defendant Robert A. Baker. As the case is one,_so far as A
it seeks to compel contribution, of which a court of equity has undoubted
jurisdiction, it could be rightfully brought here in the first instance,
even though it may be a case of which a court of law has concurrent ju-
risdiction. If, then, original relief in equity may be rightfully sought
by the complainant to compel Baker to pay his contributive share of the
judgment recovered by the principal creditor against all the sureties, why
may not the complainant, as an incident to such relief, or as supplemen-
tary to it, and in order to satisfy a demand properly enforceable in equity
inithe first instance, upon averments of Baker’s insolvency, reach prop-
erty which it is alleged Baker has caused to be fraudulently conveyed
to his wife? To hold that he cannot, for the reason that he must first
exhaust his legal remedy against Baker, isin effect to deny to the com-