10 mcnmzar. anronrns.
ordinance merely imposes a penalty for the disregard of that duty. The
testimony shows that the defendants had in their employment a person
spoken of by the witnesses as "the elevator boy," whose duty it was to
run this elevator. It is not sh own that he was not a competent person.
If he was absent fromhis post when he ought to have been there, then
he was guilty of negligence. `_ The ordinance was not intended to punish
a man for non-compliance with its requirements because in a case where
he has in his employment a competentperson whose duty it is to take
charge of and run an elevator, an injury has resulted from the negligence
of. such employe. The defendants complied with the ordina11ce; and
the most that can be said is, that if it was the duty of the elevator boy
to be at his post on the occasion referred to, to take this elevator up with
thesetpeople upon it, then his absence from his post of duty made him
guilty of negligence. Such being the true state of the case, 1 do not see
how the further conclusion is to be escaped from, that the elevator boy
was a c0·employe of the plaintiff`, and of the other employesof the defend-
ants who were on the elevator at the time.» The engineer controlling the
motive power in the basement of the building was also a co-employe.
Suppose, then, there was negligence on the part of the engineer in start-
ing the elevator for a trial trip when he did, without knowing, as it may
be  aid he ought to have known, that there were people upon it, and that
this negligence brought about the accident which befell the plaintiff', are
the defendants liable to the plaintiff for the consequences of that negli-
gence? As we all know, much has been said and written upon this sub-
ject of the liability of an employer to one servant for the negligence of a
fellow-servant; and oftentimes it is diflicult to draw the line with accu-
racy, and apply the law correctly to the given case, But much of the
doubt which has prevailed upon the subject has been cleared away by
decisions which must be regarded as controlling here. Decisions of the
federal courts upon thisquestion, are, it is said, in condict with decisions
of the supreme court of Illinois; but if the question, substantially as it
arises in the case at bar, has been determined by the supreme court of
the United States, of course the adjudications of that court must prevail
in this court., · U Q " _
Hough v. Railway _O0., 100 U. S. 213, was a case where an engineer on
a locomotive sustained aninjury caused bythe defective condition of the
pilot or cow-catcher. There was a certain person in theemployment of
the company whose duty it was to see that the engine was kept in suit-
able and proper condition for use. He was the master mechanic, to
whom was committed the exclusive management of the motive power of
the defendant’s line, with [ full control over all engineers, and with un-
restricted power to employ, direct, control, and discharge them at pleas-
ure. There had been neglect of duty in keeping the engine in safe con-
dition foruse. The pilot had been ._left in a defective and dangerous
condition, and the engineer had called the attention of the master me-
chanic to the fact, and had repeatedly requested him to have the defect
repaired,,and the engine put in safe condition for use. _The engineer
continued torun the engine, relying upon the requests that he had made