womom .v. BTUDEBAKEB. 11
to the master mechanic, and the assuranceshe had that the pilot should
be, put in proper condition. Upon that state of facts, the court held that
the company was liable to the engineer for the injury he sustained, and
that it was not relieved from liability by showing that the engineer con-
tinued to use the engine after he knew of the defect, because he had
given the company, through the personwbo had charge of the motive-
power department, notice of the defect, and had demanded that it be
repaired. This was just and right. The engineer and the master me-
chanic were engaged in distinct and different departments of service.
The master mechanic was the superior in his department, exercising con-
trol over men whose business it was, under his direction, to keep the
engines of the company in proper repair, so that they might be used
with safety by persons engaged in another branch of the company’s service.
Now let use consider the bearing upon the case we have in hand of
the case of Ramdad v. Radroad Oo., 109 U. S. 478, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322. ,
That was a case where the court held that a brakeman working a switch
for his train on one track in a railroad yard was arfellow-servant with
the engine-man of another train of the same corporation upon an adja-
cent track, and that he could not maintain an action against the corpo-
ration for an injury caused by the negligence of the engine-man in driv-
ing his engine too fast, and not giving due notice of its approach, with-
out proving negligence of the corporation in employing an unfit engine-
man. Here was a brakeman working a switch for the train on which
he was employed, on one track in a railroad yard. His employment
had no connection with the operation of the engine which was upon an
adjacent track. His work was entirely disassociated from the running
of the engine, and, by the carelessness of the engineer who controlled
the movements, of the engine, the brakeman was struck and injured.
The supreme court held that those two men, engaged in their respective
employments, were fellow-servants, according to the great preponderance
of judicial authority, and therefore that the railroad company was not
liable for the injury which the brakeman on one train sustained through
the negligence of an engineer on another train. Said Mr. Justice GRAY,
speaking for the court: - v ‘
"They are employed and paid by thesame master. The duties of the two
bring them to work at the same place, at the same time, so that the negli-
gence of the one in doing his work may injure the other in doing his work.
Their separate services have an immediate common object,—the moving of
the trains. Neither works under the orders or control of the other. Each,
by entering into his contract of service, takes the risk of the negligence of
the other in performing his service; and neither can maintain an action for
an injury caused by such negligence, against the corporation, their common
master. " V V ’
This is not in coniiict with the ruling in Railway Cb. v. Ross, 112 U.
S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184. In that case, it was decidedthat where
an engineer on ta locomotive was injured through the carelessness of
a conductor on the same train, the company was liable. The grounds
of that decision were that the conductor had the right to command the