16 ~·FEDERAL nmronrmn.-i
It may be conceded that the two estates of the husband in his wife’s
lands, as above described, exist at common law. It may also be con-
ceded that all the text writers speak of the estate by the marital right as
held by the husband " in right of the wife," and of an estate by the cur-
tesy as held by the husband in his own right. Nevertheless, it is my
opinion that the legislature did not use the words " interest of the hus-
band in her right," on which the whole argument hinges, in the tech-
nical sense now contended for, and for thc express purpose, as it is as-
sumed, of leaving the husband’s curtesy in his wife’s lands open to seiz-
ure and sale on execution during coverture. In the first place, the stat-
ute is remedial in its character, and should receive a liberal construction
to effectuate the purpose of the law-maker. The purpose ofthe legisla-
ture was to secure tothe wife and family the full enjoyment of her own
property; to protect it from seizure by the husband’s creditors and from
conveyances by the husband himself, which might affect it. With this
-general purpose in view, thelast clause of the section provides that no
`conveyance made during ooverture by the husband, "0f any interest" in
such real estate shall be valid unless, by deed', executed by the wifc
jointly with the husband} The husband himself is thus prohibited,
during coverture, from making a sale or conveyance of his estate by the
curtesy, unless with theconsent-of the wife; and it is hardlyrprobable
4 lthat, having put such at restriction on the husband’s power to convey,
even his curtesy consummate, on the death of the wife, that the legisla-
ture intended to leave this same estate open to seizure and sale on execu-
tion during coverture. Viewing the section as a whole, I think the nrst
clause was intendedrto be as comprehensive as the last,—that is to say,
creditors are forbidden, during coverture, to seize any interest of the hus-
band in the real estate of the wife, acquired by virtue of the marriage.
It is not probable, I think, that in drafting the section, the law-maker
had in view the particular distinction now invoked between an "estate
by the marital 1·ight" and an "estate by the curtesy,"iand that the words
· relied upon by the plaintiffs counsel were used advisedly with reference
to that distinction. On the contrary, it seems far more probable that,
in speaking of the husband’s interest, thewords were used, as they are
often employed in ordinary conversation, to indicate the source from
whence the interest had been derived. V · ‘
· Something was said in the course of the argument to the effect that
the sale of the*·husband’s curtesy would not impair the wife’s powerto
fully enjoy her own property during coverture, inasmuch as the pur-
chaser at such sale could only be letinto possession whenthe curtesy be-
came consummate at the wife’s death. In other words, it was not claimed
that the husband’s estate by the curtesy initiate would pass at such sale,
Yas that would lead to a disturbance of the wife’s possession during cover-
ture, and to asequestration of the rents and profits which are expressly
exempt by thestatute from seiaureand-sale. Withreference to this sug-
gestion it is only necessary to say‘that if plaintiffs construction of the
statute be correct, it is easy to foresee several ways ie which the»wife’s
right to the uninterrupted and full enjoyment of her property, whichthe