» sraoxo v. mtrrmn srsrrs. 23
4, 1886, repeal the earlier statutes under which docketfees were allowed
to commissioners? See 24 U. S. St. at Large, 256, 274. The title of
the act of August 4, 1886, is "An act making appropriations to supply
deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1886,
and for prior years, and for other purposes/’ showing that the purpose
of the act was; not only to makeappropriations to supply deciencies in
the appropriations for thefiscal yearending June 30, 1886, but that
there were other objects in view. One of these objects is clearly shown
upon the face of the act, where it is expressly declared that commission-
01`S shall be entitled to receive fees for certain services thereinyspecilzied,
but they shall not be entitled to any docket fees. ·The language is "that
for issuing any warrant or writ, and for any other necessary service, com-
missioners may he paid the same compensation as is allowed to clerks
_for like services, but they shall not be entitled to any docket fees." If
the intention of congress was simply that docket fees were to be excepted
from the sum _appropriated inthat act for the payment of commissioners,
then why was any reference made to their compensation for issuingwar-
rants, writs,. etc.?. Why did not congress simply say, "provided that
no part, of this appropriation shall be applied to the payment of docket
fees‘?" Under the construction contended for, the only eifeotto be given
the clause underconsideration is retrospective, and that it should apply ·
only in those cases where the commissioners had not-been paid, or would
not be paid, their fees for services rendered during the year ending June
,30, 1886, out of the regular appropriations for that year, The clause
under consideration is found in a proviso in the deficiency appropriation
hill for 1886. 3 But for the fact that the clause declaringthat commis-
sioners shall not be entitled to any docket fees comes under a proviso,
there would be no difficultyat all in determining whatthe intention of
congress was. As a general rule, a proviso is intended to restrain the
.enacting clause, and to except something whichwouldotherwise have
been within it., , But I look on this proviso as a legislative construction of
the law,-·-as ' a legislative declaration by congress that commissioners
shall notbe entitledto docket fees, notwithstanding the decision of the
supreme court., Congress having spoken on the subject, it is the duty
of. the courts to give effect to its words. , {
What reason could congress have for declaring, in effect, that although
commissioners had theretofore been entitled to docket fees, and although
they shall be entitled to them hereafter, yet they shall not be entitled to
have them paid out of this small appropriation? Such, however, is the
contention. ,How unreasonable and unjust would such a construction
of the statutemake the action of congress. Is it not more reasonable
and just tohold that congress intended to make the law applicable to,
and to operate prospectively on, all commissioners alike,—toput them
-all-on the samefooting, by cutting 0H` all docket fees from that time?
. v It may be that the statute under consideration isframed in an inartifi-
cial manner;-that there iswant of perspicuityor Pfecision ih; UZ-, When
_this is the case, courts are often required to look less at the letter Qt words
of the statute than at thereason and spirit of the law tin endeavoring to