24 · ·   nmromm. ‘
arrive at the will of the law-maker. It is well known that there had
been much controversy over the claim set up by commissioners to docket
fees; they contending for them, and the comptroller of the treasury deny-
ing their right to them. At last the matter was brought into the courts,
and the supreme court decided thatcommissioners were entitled to such
fees. In a few months thereafter congress passed the act of August 4,
‘ 1886, in whichit makes ‘a- denciency appropriation to pay commision-
_ ers’ fees, and for other purposes, and in which act it takes occasion to
say that commissioners shall not be entitled to any docket fees. Is there
any other‘conclusion_ than that the reason and spirit of that act was to
meet the decision of the supreme court, and to finally settle by a legisla-
. tive declaration the question in controversy? Again, it is contended that
inasmuch as congress did notcontinue the proviso,-·-or exception, as it
is called,—in the appropriation bill for the year ending June 30, 1887,
the act of August 4, 1886, had themtfect only to suspend section 828
temporarily. It seemsto methe fact that the provision denyingthe
payment of docket fees to commissioners was omitted from the appropri-
ation bill for the year ending June 30, 1887, is avery strong argument
-to show that the intention of congress was to abrogate the statute allow-
ing such fees by adoptin the provision on that subject to be found in the
‘ act of August 4, 1886, which `we have been considering.- And this argu-
ment is strengthened by the tfactthat both acts were passed on the same
day, August 4, 1886. See 24 St. at Large, 222,256. ‘ Docket fees hav-
ing been abolished by one act passed on that day, there was no reason
for another act tothe same effect, on the same day. I cannot adopt the
view contended for by the petitioneriunless I eliminate from the act the
words, "they shall not be entitled to any docket fees,"‘ which congress
has inserted; " My duty is to give them eifect. Not only do these words,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were used, make the
intention of congress manifest, but that intention is plainly repugnant to
the former statutes,—sections 828, 847 ,-as construed by the supreme
court. My opinion, therefore, is ’that the later statute repealed the ear-
lier, although there are no express words of repeal employed in it; and I
am constrained to hold that the petitioner is notientitled to recover any
docket fees in this suit. U. S. v. Fisher, 109 U. Sr 143, 3 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 154; U.- S. v. JW/tchell, 109 U. S. 146, 3 Sup. Ot. Rep. 151.
I Since the trialiin this case the charge for docketentries has been aban-
`doned and withdrawn, _ ‘ ‘·   is
y By an order of the circuit court· in this district commissioners are re-
quired to forward to the clerkiof the United States ci1·cuit court a tran-
script or certified copy of the proceedings in every case on their docket.
For this copy I think they are entitled to be paid at the rate of 10 cents
ia folio, and for-· the certincate to it·15-cents a folio. I ind that such
copy- averages two folios, and thatthe charge made by the petitioner for
the certificate iscorrect. Rev. St; §§t828, 847. The same orderof the _
circuit court requires a" commissioner to make out and forward to the
clerk of the court, at the end of each month, a report in duplicate of all
cases instituted or examined duringithe month. The petitioner has