summer crnmnna cir.-`mni eo. bduicrrreaiv Lunnrcuon co. 35
think the court‘reasonably~reached as Qproper conclusion; andwe will not
review that new. They hadthe facts `before them, and Mr. Parshall, -
the alleged original inventor was before them, and heitestified to the use
ofthe machines in those two instances. Now, if human testimony is to
be credited, Willetts and Parshall both identified the machines that they ,
made in 1869 as corresponding identically with the machine here pre-
sented, and which was tested at the copper-worksiand at the Champion
mills. Mr. Baugh says,—and the dinicultyxarises on Mr. Baugh’s tes-
timony,-•eMr. Baugh says that was not the machine he used, at least not
in that form. Mr. Baugh identifies the formtof a dsilferent machine cor-
responding with a photograph now presented, and which the proof indi-
cates, from Mr. Parsha1l’s own statements, previously made, was made
at a later period than 1869. · I . ' r · V y · ‘ .
Now, what was Parshall enga.ged in, and what are the probabilities?
When we come to consider, evidence, we must consider probabilities.
Mr. Parshall was engaged in an effort to invent a lubricatorthat would
do its work, and conform to the needs of the business and of the trade.
He was engaged in the effort to invent an up—drop lubricator, andwe
have him, according to the testimony of Mr. Baugh, now introduced, as
having perfected that sort of a. machine in June, 1869, and yet we find
Mr. Parshall postponingan application, although an inventor, and en-
gaged in the effort at inventing and discovering thatwant,-··-we find
him failing to make any application for an up-drop lubricatornntil 1878.
Now, is itnot probable that Mr. Parshall must have known more about
this than any other living man? Is it probable that, if he had hadja
completed invention or a thing that performed its work as eliiciently as
it is now alleged that the plaintitl"s does he would have postponed his
application for a patent upon that invention until 1878, when he pre-
sented a different instrument; The probabilties are against that theory.
_ Matters of importance are not conducted in that way. Inventors do not
act in that way. If Mr. Parshall had in 1869 what isnow claimed, Mr. ‘
Parshall would undoubtedly have applied for a patent for it. The prob-
abilities from Mr. Parsha]l’s conduct, and the probabilities from Mr. Par-
shall’s previous testimony, are all very decidedly in favor of the fact that
Mr. Baugh is in some way mistaken as to what he had or as to the date
at which he- had it. ‘
Now, in addition to that, the abandonment by Parshall is some evi-
dence of an incomplete instrument. Looking at him in his situation as
an inventor engaged in an effort to make a machine that would work,
the abandonment of the Baugh machine is evidence, and strongly per-
suasive evidence, of some incompleteness in the machine itself, such as
was found by Judge   and by Judge Comin the preceding cases,
in which they found that the machine as used at the copper-works and
at the Champion mills was a defective and incomplete machine. We
have this strong prima. facie case besides the presumption of the patent,
and in view of thedecisions we are not satisfied that Mr. Baugh’s evi-
dence breaksdown that strong prima facie case. We will, therefore, al-
low the injunction to stand. ·