EMACK v. KANE. 49
Many more extracts might be made from these circulars, which ap-
pear in the proof, but this is enough to show the spirit in which the de-
fendant attempted to intimidate the complainant’s customers from deal-
ing with him, or dealing in the slates manufactured by him; and the
proof shows abundantly that much business has been diverted from the
complainant by these threats and circulars; that the complainant’s busi-
ness has been seriously injured, and his profits very much abridged by
the course pursued in sending out these circulars. The proof in this
case also satisfies me that these threats made by defendants were not
made ingood faith. The proof shows that defendants brought three
suits against Emackls customers, for alleged infringement of the Good-
rich patent by selling the Emack slates; that Emack assumed the de-
fense in these cases, and,.after the proofs were taken, and the suits ripe
for hearing, the defendants voluntarily dismissed them,—the dismissals
being, entered under such circumstances as to fully show that the defend-
ants knew that they could not sustain the suits upon their merits; that
said suits were brought in a mere spirit of bravado or intimidation, and
I10l3.Wll3l1;8. bona fide intent to submit the question of infringement to at
judicial decision. _ , _ _
— The defense interposed is—I*’irst, that these circula_rs were mere friendly
notices to the trade of the claims made by defendants as to what was
covered by the Goodrich patent; second, that a court of equity has no ju-
risdiction to entertain a bill of this character, and restrain a party from
issuing circulars, even if they are injurious to the trade of another.
In support of this latter point defendants rely upon the opinion of Mr.
J-llStlQ8;BRADLEY, in Kidd v. Harry, 28 Fed. Rep. 773, and Wheel C’o.,v.
Bem·is,,2Q Fed. Rep. 95, decided by Judges Com: and CARPENTER in the
district court of Massachusetts. Kidd v. Horry was an application for
an injunction restrainingthe defendant from, publishing certain circular
. letters alleged to be injurious to the patent-rights and business of the com-
plainant, and from making and uttering libel_ous and slanderous state-
ments, written or oral, of, or concerning the business of, complainant,
or concerning the validity of their letters patent, or of their title thereto,
pending the trial and adjudication of a suit which had been brought to
restrain the infringement of said patents; and Mr. Justice BRADLEY in
deciding the case said:
" The application seems to be altogether a novel one, and is urged_ princi-
pally upon a line of recent English authorities, such as Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7
Eq. 488; Food Co. v. Massam, 14 Ch. Div. 763; Thomas v. Williams, 'ld. 864;
and Loag»v.’.Bean, 26 Ch. Div. 306. An examination of these and other cases
mclied on·convinces us that they depend on certain facts of the parliament of
Great Britain. and not on the general principles of equity jurisprudence.
* * 35 But neither the statute law of this country, nor any well-consid-
ered judgment of a court, has introduced this new branch of equity into our
· jnrisprudence. There may be a case or two looking that way, but none that
we deem ofsutllcient authority to justify us in assuming the jurisdiction.
* * *re We do not think that the existence of malice in publishing a libel,
or uttering slanderous words, can make any difference in the jurisdiction of
the court.34Malice1 is pharged in almost every case of libel; and no cases or
v. E.no. —-