60 rnnnnan nnronran.
authority can be found, we-think, independent of statute, in -wh<i·ch1the power
toissue an injunction to restrain- a.1i·bel: or slanderous wordsr»has;{evei· been
maintained, whether malicemzas charged or not." V s , _  
’ lThe·'principle of this case, eonciselystated, is that `a court of equity
hasno jurisdiction to restrainthe 'publication of a libel or slander. But
it seems to me the case now under consideration is fairly different and
distinguishable from the cases relied upon `by the defendants in what
seems to me a material and vital feature. In Kidd v. Harry the owner
0f a patent sought the interference of a court of equitytoi restrain the
defen ants from; publishingand putting in circulation statements chal- —
lenging thevalidity of his patent, and -of his title thereto, on the ground
that suchpublications were libelous attacks upon his property. Here
the complainant seeksto restrain the defendants ·from' tnakingthreats
intended to intimidate the complainants customersflnnder the pretext
that complainant’s goods infringe a patent downed or controlled by de-
fendants, ”andY‘threats that if such customers deal in complainanfsgoods
they will subject themselves 'to suitlfor such infringement; the bill charg-
` ing, andthe proof showing, that ithese charges of infringement arepnot
made in good faith, but with a malicious intent to injure anddestroy
the c0mplainant’s business. While; it maybe that theiowner of apatent
cannot invokeithfelaid of a court of equity to prevent another person from
publishing. lstatemenltsdenying the validity of such` patent by circulars
to the trade, or otherwise, yet; iftheowner of a patent; instead of resort-
ing to the courts toobtain redress for alleged infringements ofhis patent,
threatens   ‘wh*o,_deal in the goods of a competitor with suitslfor. infringe-
·ment, “thereby’intin1idatingsuch customers from dealing with such, com-
petitor, and destroying his compétitor’s business, itwould seemito make
'a widely diifereihtcase from Kidd- v. Harry, andfhat such acts `of intim-
idation should fall within the preventive reach of acourt of equity; ‘ It
may notibe“libelous· for the- owner ’of a patent to charge-‘that an article
’made by another`°manufacturer infringes ‘his 'patent‘;*"and"notice of an
alleged*inf1‘1'ngen1‘ent may, if giv‘en`·in good faith, be a considerate and
kind act on thepart of the owner ofthe patent; but tbegmvamem of this
‘case is the} attempted “intimidatibn‘ by defendants fof "cbmplainant’s cus-
tomers by ·tbreatening·thern`withsuits which defendantisididnot intend
to prosecute; and this feature was not involved in Kidd vi Harry, loan-
. not believe, that a man isrremediless against persistent, and continued
attacksfuponhispbusiness, andproperty rights in hisfbusiness, such as
` have been perpetrated by these defendants against_t-heconiplainant, as
shown bythe proofs in this case. »; It shocks my senseof justice tosay
that acourt of iequity cannot restrain systematic·and<frnethodicaloutrages
like this, by one'inan_·upon another’s property rights: 'jlf‘a_courtfof equity
cannot lrestrainfan attack likethis upon a iman’s biisiness, then the party
iscertaiiilyjreniediless, because an aotionat law in   cases would do
_no'good,Q`a¤d;,ruin. would ,be accomplished before an adjudication would
bezreachedr » True, it may- ,be~said:tthat.the injured party has at remedy
at ·law,~ but Ethat might implyamvultiplicity of suits which equity often
*interposé’s torelieve from; butithe*still more cogent reasonseems to"be