

mate's testimony that on arrival the wood had not dropped away from any others except the two injured, will not permit the inference that it arose from rough weather alone; since in that case the wood between other drums would have been similarly affected. The only fair inference of fact is that the wood between these two drums was not secured in the usual and proper manner, and that negligence in this respect was the cause of the wood's dropping out, and thereby of the leakage which caused the loss. *The Burgundia*, 29 Fed. Rep. 607; *The Surrey*, Id. 608, and note. In *The Polynesia*, 30 Fed. Rep. 210, there were no special circumstances indicating negligence on the part of the ship.

The libellant is therefore entitled to a decree for the amount claimed, with interest and costs.

THE JOHN COTTRELL.

THE STARLIGHT.

LAVERTY v. THE JOHN COTTRELL and THE STARLIGHT.

(District Court, S. D. New York. April 21, 1888.)

1. SHIPPING—CARRIAGE OF GOODS—LIABILITY FOR LOSS.

The lighter J. C., with a deck-load of iron bars, moored outside of another vessel lying at a wharf. As the tide went down, she took the bottom, or some obstruction, gradually careened, and lost her deck-load overboard. She selected the mooring place herself, which was an improper one, and was left without a watchman. *Held*, that she was responsible for the loss of the iron.

2. COLLISION—AT PIER—COSTS—FIFTY-NINTH RULE.

On being libeled in this suit, the lighter brought in under the fifty-ninth admiralty rule the barge S., which was the vessel along-side of which she had moored, claiming that the barge, being moored unskillfully, had careened against her, forced down her rail, and thus caused the loss of the deck-load. *Held* that, even had the accident occurred in this way, the barge S. was not liable, as she owed no duty to the lighter, which had moored along-side of her own volition, without request or permission, and at her own risk. Being brought into the suit by petition of the lighter C., *held*, that the barge should recover her costs of the C., and not of the libellant.

In Admiralty.

Hyland & Zabriskie, for libellant.

Edwin G. Davis, for the John Cottrell.

Goodrich, Deady & Goodrich, for the barge.

BROWN, J. In July, 1887, the libellant contracted with the owners to transport for them a quantity of iron bars from the Pennsylvania Railroad, Jersey City, to Cornell's wharf, foot of Twenty-Sixth street, North river. The libellant thereupon made a subcontract with the captain of the lighter John Cottrell to transport the iron. The cargo was loaded and taken to the basin in which Cornell's wharf is located, where the

¹Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.

lighter arrived about 7 o'clock in the evening of the 4th of August. The basin is formed by a causeway built of stone and rubble, which, curving outward and to the northward from the foot of Twenty-Sixth street, runs up in a line with the river for about 1,000 feet, leaving but a narrow inlet of from 40 to 60 feet wide along the front of Cornell's wharf, between that and the causeway. The wall of the causeway was not vertical, and the testimony is not satisfactory as to the actual width of the basin in front of the wharf. When the Cottrell arrived there was no one present to give directions where she should go. Another vessel was lying by the wharf to the southward, and there was not room for another to lie along-side. A little to the north of the wharf, or about opposite to its northern end, the barge Starlight was moored along-side the causeway, but angling a little towards the wharf, and the captain of the lighter concluded to moor along-side the barge. About 4 o'clock on the following morning the lighter careened towards the barge to such an extent that the iron, which was loaded on deck, slid off into the water. This suit was brought to recover for the loss and for the damage to the iron thereby occasioned.

It was claimed by the lighter that the barge was improperly moored; so that, by slipping upon the rocks and careening outward, she caught the lighter's rail, and gradually pressed her down until the iron was precipitated into the water. I do not think the evidence sustains this contention; nor, if it were true, do I think the barge could have been held answerable for the damages. Even if she had been moored unskillfully, having reference to the peculiarities of the place, and was liable to take the ground and careen at low water, she owed no duty in that respect to the lighter, which moored along-side of her of her own volition, without request or permission, and, as I find, at her own risk. The duty of watching, as regards any results of grounding, was the duty of each as regards her own safety. When the lighter arrived none of the barge's men were on board, but only a watchman for the night. As against the Starlight the libel must therefore be dismissed; but inasmuch as she was brought in as a party defendant on petition of the Cottrell, under rule 59 in admiralty, the Cottrell, and not the libellant, must pay the costs.

There is a conflict as regards the precise place where the barge and lighter were moored, and as to the cause of the accident. There is considerable evidence to show that the barge extended into the narrow entrance abreast of the wharf, and was angling a little across it, so as to bring the lighter's bows very near to the upper end of the wharf; and that with the fall of the tide the side of the lighter caught upon some projecting log, thereby causing her to careen to starboard, as above stated. This theory finds some confirmation in the fact testified to by the barge's witnesses that neither the barge nor her lines showed any traces of change or injury, such as must have happened had she slid down upon the sloping rocky bottom at the low ebb, when this accident took place. This is sustained by the majority of disinterested witnesses, and, I am inclined to think, is the more probable account of the accident. The lighter was not moored in the usual or customary place, or

in the usual manner. She was left without a watchman, or, if the man on board was intended as a watchman, he wholly neglected his duties, and got on deck but a few moments before the iron went overboard. The evidence shows that the iron was lost after several hours of gradual careening of the lighter, and, as would appear from the almanac, at just about low water. From whichever of the two causes assigned the accident happened, this was not reasonable and proper care for a cargo like iron, liable to slip off the deck. Without considering, therefore, the question whether the lighter, in a case like the present, was under the obligations of a common carrier, which many late authorities in this country would seem to sustain, (see Hutch. Carr. §§ 58, 61; Browne, Carr. §§ 74, 32, note; *Sumner v. Caswell*, 20 Fed. Rep. 249,) I think the lighter must be held answerable for not in the first place making the necessary inquiries and examination to obtain a safe place to moor for the night, in a place where the circumstances were evidently peculiar and unusual, and also, after having thus moored without ascertainment or inquiry, for being left without any watchman to look after her safety at night during the rise and fall of the tide in such a place.

The libellant is entitled to a decree against the Cottrell, with costs.

THE GIULIO.¹

PAOLILLO *v.* ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND FORTY BALES OF VEGETABLE HAIR.

CORMACK *et al.* *v.* THE GIULIO.

(*District Court, S. D. New York.* April 30, 1888.)

1. SHIPPING—CARRIAGE OF GOODS—UNREASONABLE DELAY.

A vessel chartered to the Mediterranean and back to New York, put into her home port in Italy on account of stress of weather. Some repairs were put on her there, and, after their completion, she was detained three weeks longer, through acute rheumatism of the master. *Held*, that the owner was not justified in detaining the vessel in her home port for such reason, without indemnifying the charterer for the expense and loss caused by the delay.

2. SAME.

A vessel is liable for the fall in market prices during a period of negligent delay on her part, though such delay arose before the cargo was shipped, when the delay was voluntary, and was in the course of the voyage contracted for by the charter, and after it had been entered upon.

3. SAME—WAIVER.

Charterers who load a vessel with return cargo after a period of negligent delay on the part of the vessel do not thereby necessarily waive the right of action which has already accrued to them for the breach of the ship's legal duty of dispatch in fulfilling the charter requirements.

4. SAME.

Where objection that a vessel has not taken a full cargo is not made at the time when objections in other respects are made by protest, any complaint made afterwards on this score should be looked upon with suspicion.

¹Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.