8 , · _ FEDERAL Rmroarnn.
Such further facts as it may be necessary to refer to will be found set
forth in the opinion. .
Ashbel Ween-and Howard Mansfield, for the demurrer.
Frank F.rVan Derveer, (Adrian H. Joline and William Allen Butler, of
counsel,) c<mtra.· `
“ LAcoMBE,*J. '1. The iirst ground of demurrer suggested is that this
court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit; that it is a
suit in rem., to establish the lien of a mortgage, and foreclose the same;
and that the mortgaged premises are wholly in territory not within the
Southern district of New York. By certain acts of the legislature of New
York, the jurisdiction of that state in and over the land belonging to the
United States at West Point wasceded to the federal government. Owner-
ship of and jurisdiction over such territory are both in the United States,
and therefore, as demurrants contend, "those lands are wholly excluded
from the territory of the state." By section 541 of the Revised Statutes
ofthe United States, the state of New York is divided into three districts,
the Northern and Eastern of which are described as including certain
counties of said state, with the waters thereof, while the Southern dis-
trict is defined as including "the residue of said state, with the waters
thereof." Hence it is contended that the government reservation, being
no longer a part of the state for any purpose, is not included within such
residue, andtherefore is not within the Southern district of New York.
The authorities cited in support of this proposition fall within one or
other of two groups. To the first belong such decisions as that of the
New York supreme court in Murdock v; Railway Co. , Orange special term,
December, 1885, which was a suit brought by the trustees, who are de-
fendants here, to foreclose this very mortgage. They hold that when
the state has by express statute turned over to the federal government a
portion of its territory, indicating in plain language its intention no longer
to claim or exercise jurisdiction therein, theinhabitants of the ceded tract
thereafter neither have political nor civil rights, nor are liable to the bur-
dens of citzenship under the laws of the state. Inasmuch as the federal
constitution, art. 1, § 8, subd. 16, authorizes congress to exercise ex-
clusive jurisdiction over such places, state statutes abandoning state ju-
. risdiction therein are held to have accomplished their evident intent. State
jurisdiction is thereafter at an end. To this group belong Dibble v. Clapp,
31 How. Pr. 420; Com. v. Olary,.8 Mass. 72, 1 Metc. 580; Mitchell v.
Tibbetts, 17 Pick. 298. To the other group belong those cases in which
it is held that when congress in organizing territorial governments, or es-
tablishing the limits of jurisdiction for some particular tribunal, has ex-
pressly excepted certain lands out of such jurisdiction or government,
they constitute no part of such territory or district, although they are in-
cluded within its geographical boundaries. Here again the federal statute
is interpreted according to its plain intent. To this group of cases be-
long U. S. v. Dawson, 15 How. 467; Langford v. Monteith, 102 U. S. 145;
Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476. The question raised by the demurrer
in this case, however, is controlled by none of the decisions above cited.