*10 r r . · · FEDERAL ruaronrna. r , , _
1NoZ federal statute passed subsequent to the creation of the New York
district, and accepting the cession of these lands, is cited by counsel. It
appears that in 1790 (chapter 26., ¢1 St. at’Large,- 129) ,"the president
was authorized to cause to be purchased for the use of the United States
therwhole or such part of that, tractf of land, situate in the state of New
York,. commonly called ‘West Point,’ as shall be by him judged requisite
for thepurpose of such fortifications and garrisons asmay be necessary
for the defense of the same." The executive has from time to time since
purchased these lands, apparentlysolely under this authority. To find
inthisact, howevergrsanction for the proposition contended for by the
demurrants, would be to hold that the very same congress (lst Cong.
1789-1791) which created the New York district provided that the lands
at West. Point might at any time thereafter by mere executive action,
whether congress were in session or not, be taken out of the district, and
left a _no·man’s. land, wholly unprovided either with state or federal
courts. There is nothing in the phraseology of the act of · 1790 to war-
rant such aconstruction. Neither is there anything in theopinion in
Re Man·ufmcturing.O0., 108 U. S. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894, in confiict with
the views above expressed.. In all the instances of, a shifting boundary
therein referred to, there wasa federal statute ratifying or approving the
. changer. The assent ofcongress was given to the contract between New
Yorkmld New Jersey by the actrof June 28, 1843, (chapter 126, 4 St.
at Large, *708.) _ The cession by Massachusetts to New York of the dis-
trict of- Boston Corner was consented to by the act of January 3, 1855,
(chapter.20, 10 St. at Large, 602.) The conventional boundary line be-
tween Massachusetts and Rhode Island was sanctioned by the act of
February 9, 1859, (chapter 28,,11 St. at Large, 382.) Each of these
.acts,—when—·read: in connection with the judiciary act of 1789 , plainly im-
ported that, when a state boundary was changed, lands theretofore as-
signed to one-district were or were to be transferred, to another. It was
never pretended that any such change was effected by the mere operation
of statef statutes, and in the case at bar there is cited no federal statute
which will bear such construction. ~ s r ·‘
2. The contention of the demurrants that the pendency of the action
in the state. court brought by thetrusteesto foreclose the same mortgage
is a bar to this suit is conclusively answered by a reference to Stanton v·.
Embrey, 93 U; S. 548; Insurance O0. v.iBrune’s Assignee, 96 U. S. 588;
Weaver v.  16 Fed. Rep. 22; . , 1;
»- 3.._¥l`he demurrants next challenge the bill upon the theory that the
complainant has not a standing in court for the purposes of this suit.
Themortgagecontains a clause providing that in case of default for the
space. of .four months in the payment of interest the principal shall be-
eomedue, and that the trustees may, and "upon the written request of the
holders ofamajority in amountof *» .* * outstanding bonds, shall
* *» · 7* M; withina reasonable time, being not less than four months, pro-
oecd to ifcreclose the mortgage,"» retc; Acting upon such request, the
trustees; in December, 1884, commenced a suit in the supreme court of
the state, which was dismissed atspecial trial term, December, 1885, for