rlé , ..   —· A mpnnan B.m1>oB’1‘ER. , , _ ·  
CAMPBELL v. CITY or Naw Yom:. . Y
(Oircuit Uowri, 8. .D. NewYork. May 22, 1888.) ~
Equrrr-P1.n.u>me—SurrLmmmNran Bran. ‘
Where the complainant in an original bill has, since bringing the suit,
parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter,.and those for whom he
· was trustee have transferred their,whole interest in the subject-matter to A,
and the title to any sum of money which may be recovered in the suit has  
these transfers become vested in A., the remedy of A. is by an original b1 l
in the nature of a supplemental bill, and not by a supplemental bill.
In Equity. On demurrer to supplemental bill. For hearing on
pleas to supplemental bill, see 33 Fed. Rep. 795. .
James B. Lockwood, (Marcus?. Norton, of counsel,) for complainant.
Henry ‘D. Hadlock. for Philbrook.
» George Bliss and Sherman M Rogers, for Green and Murphy.
~ W.u.r.Aon, J. The theory upon which this supplemental bill proceeds
is that Campbell, the complainant inthe original bill, since bringing the
suit, has parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter, and that
those for whom Campbell was trustee have transferred their whole inter-
est in the subject-matterto Philbrook, or to Philbrook and Knibbs, and
that the title to any sum of money which may be recovered in the suit
has by thesetransfers become vested in Philbrook, orin Philbrook and
Knibbs. Upon such a state of facts the remedy of Philbrook is by an
original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, and not by a supple·
mental bill. This was distinctly stated in the opinion announced upon
the hearing of the motion in which Philbrook applied for leave to be
madea co-complainant. , Although the distinction between supplemental
bills and original bills seems to rest upon purely artificial reasons, it is
well recognized, and is attended in practice with consequences which ati
feet the substantial rights of parties. If the cestuis que trust had not
transferred all their interest in the subiect-matter, and there had been
simply ja change of trustees by operation at law,) or if there had been
only a partial alienation of the title of Campbell, a supplemental bill
mightvlie. As it is, the demurrer must be sustained. Mitf. Eq. P1.
-65, 98; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 66,.84; Story, Eq. Pl. 349; Tappan v.-Smith, 5
Bis. 73. The third ground of objection assigned in the demurrer suin-
oiently raises the point. »