34; rrmnnau. amronrnn.
but it is insisted that because the order of the county court defining the
limits of the town embraced some acres of farming lands, the order was
null and void, and that the bonds- subsequently issued were for that rea-
son invalid, even in the hands of a bona jide holderfor value. The posi-
tion so taken I regard as untenable for the following reasons: It is not
true that the order of thecounty court was utterly void. The most that
. can be said of it is that it was erroneous, and voidable in a` proper pro-
ceeding brought to-test its legality. In granting the decree of incorpo-
ration the county court acted judicially on a subject—matter that was `
clearly within its jurisdiction. Its decree may have been, and no doubt
was, erroneous, if certain agricultural landswere included within the
outboundaries of the town; but the order was obligatory, and had the
effect of creating a corporation which could act as such, and incur debts,
until the state obtained judgment of ouster for the-'alleged defect in the
order of incorporation, or until the order or decree of the county court was
quashed in a proceeding by certiorari, if the latterproceeding was admis-
sible. Such was the view taken of the effect of orders of incorporation
granted by-county courts in the case of Kayser v.`Bremen, 16 Mo. 88. It
was there held in effect that such orders. are so far valid (being judgments
of courts having jurisdiction of the subjectrrnatter) that they cannot be
assailed collaterally or by other persons than the state from whom the
municipality derives its charter. . It isto be noted also that the decision
in Kayser v. Bremen was expressly approved in Macon Oo. v. Shores, 97
U. S,272. The 1ate_r case of State v. Mclkynotds, 61 Mo. 203, does not
overrule or question the decision in Kayser v. Bremen, butis evidently in
harmony with it. The case of State v. McReynotds, was a direct proceed-
ing in the nature of a quo warmp.to, brought by the state to annul the
charter of a town because over l,0OQ acres of agricultural lands had been
included within the corporate limits. No question arose in that case as
to the validity of contracts entered into, or other corporate acts done by
the town after it was incorporated, andbefore judgment of ouster was pro-
nounced, nor was the question whether the order of incorporation was
void, or merely erroneous and voidable, considered or determined. I _
accordingly conclude that the decision in.Kayser v. Bremen is at this day
an authoritative exposition of the law of the state, and that decision neces-
sarily implies that an order of incorporation which is defective only in
the respect that it includes some, farming lands, is not void. but is to be
treated aserroneous and voidable in adirect proceeding brought by the
proper party to annul it. Inaccordance with this view, it follows that,
although there was a flaw in _the charter of the town of Kahoka which
might have warranted a judgment of ouster if the state had ever elected
to question the validity of the order of incorporation on that ground,· yet,
until the entry of such judgment, it was a corporation de jure as well as
de facto, and as such had authority to issue the bonds in suit.
;.Some questions not heretoforeballuded to were discussed on the trial of
the cause. For example, it was urged that in noevent can any party
but the state take advantage of a defect in the charter of a municipal cor-
poration of the kind involved in this suit, and that the state of Missouri